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Abstract
Using administrative tax records for UK businesses, we document both bunch-
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1 Introduction
Most countries around the world use the value-added tax (VAT) as their primary indirect tax.
It is standard to set a minimum registration threshold, usually based on annual turnover,
below which businesses do not need to register for VAT. In the EU, a large majority of
countries currently have a registration threshold, with the UK threshold being the highest
at £85,000 ($110,000).1 As VAT rates are often quite high (in excess of 20% in many EU
countries), this may create a large and salient tax notch for businesses whose turnover is
around the threshold, depending on firm characteristics as we explain below.2 The effects of
these VAT notches on firm behavior have received little attention in the existing literature.
In this paper, we study the behavior of firms around the VAT registration threshold
theoretically and also empirically, using administrative data on UK corporations. We begin
by documenting two stylized facts. First, we find strong evidence that some firms bunch
below the registration threshold by restricting their reported turnover to avoid having to
register for the VAT.3 Second, we observe that in any year, a large fraction of firms with
turnover below the current-year threshold were registered for VAT (on average 43%, over
the period 2004-2014). This behavior seems to be deliberate, rather than accidental. For
example, of the firms initially registered with turnover below the threshold on 2004/5, about
half of them are still registered and below the threshold three years later. We call these
firms voluntarily registered.4 This is noteworthy because voluntary payment of any tax by
businesses, when it is explicitly optional, is uncommon.5
How can we explain the coexistence of voluntary VAT registration and bunching at the
threshold? We develop a simple general equilibrium model that can explain both these
phenomena in a unified way. Our first observation is that for both behaviors to occur
1There is a positive registration threshold in all but five EU countries: Greece, Hungary, Malta, Spain
and Sweden. For details, see www.vatlive.com.
2A notch arises when the tax liability changes discontinuously.
3Bunching is generally inefficient for two reasons. First, it might artificially reduce some firms’ size
and growth. Moreover, unregistered firms face so-called embedded VAT on inputs they acquire from VAT-
registered firms, which distorts their input choices and may cascade through the production chain (Ebrill et
al., 2001).
4The UK fiscal year starts in early April.
5Of course, this behavior may be due to the fact that, in a VAT system, firms play the role of fiscal
intermediaries. As such, they do not necessarily bear the burden of the tax which they must legally remit
to the government.
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simultaneously within a given sector, firms in that sector must make both sales to final
consumers (B2C sales) and sales to other VAT-registered businesses (B2B sales). Moreover,
these firms must themselves use intermediate inputs in production. To see this, suppose
that firms make only B2C sales. Then, it is easily shown that irrespective of the degree of
competition between firms, the cost of voluntary registration exceeds the benefit, because the
burden of VAT paid on output when registered exceeds the burden of VAT paid on inputs
when not registered.6 Conversely, with only B2B sales, voluntary registration is always
weakly optimal, absent compliance costs, because the burden of output VAT can be passed
on to the buyer. However, it is only strictly optimal if the firm uses inputs on which it can
then claim back input VAT.
It follows that the most parsimonious model that can explain both voluntary registration
and bunching must have three stages of production, because the small firms must sell some
of their output to other VAT-registered firms and buy inputs that bear VAT.7
In this paper, we present such a model, and derive three main predictions. First, we
show that voluntary registration by a firm is more likely when (i) the cost of inputs relative
to sales is high; (ii) when the proportion of B2C sales by the firm is low; (iii) when markets
are less competitive i.e. firms have higher mark-ups. 8 The intuition for (i) is that, when
input costs are important, registration allows the firm to claim back a considerable amount
of input VAT. The intuition for (ii) is simply that, if most customers are VAT-registered, the
burden of an increase in VAT can easily be passed on in the form of a higher price, because
the customer itself can claim back the increase. The intuition for (iii) is also simple; in a
more competitive market, it is more difficult to pass on the burden of output VAT.
Second, we show that the determinants of bunching at the registration threshold are
6This is proved very generally in Appendix A below.
7This implies that the two best-known models of VAT thresholds, Keen and Mintz (2004) and de Paula
and Scheinkman (2010), are not suitable for our purposes because both models only have two stages of
production. Indeed, as explained in more detail in Section 5, neither of these models can explain the
coexistence of voluntary registration and bunching.
8Both these characteristics clearly differ widely across small firms that are close to the registration
threshold. For example, a small sole trader such as a plumber or electrician may typically have mostly
B2C sales of his services to householders, and make relatively light use of intermediate inputs. So, they
would face a low effective VAT rate when not registered, but a high rate when registered. Conversely, a
small specialist engineering firm, such as a car component firm, may make mostly B2B sales with heavy use
of intermediate inputs, and so will be in the reverse position.
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the same as for voluntary registration, with the signs of the effects reversed. Specifically,
bunching is more likely when (i) the cost of inputs relative to sales is low; (ii) when the
proportion of B2C sales is high, or (iii) when markets are more competitive 9
In addition to the three main predictions, note that extending the model to allow for
evasion responses does not affect any of our qualitative predictions. We discuss this extended
model in online Appendix A.
The third contribution of the paper is to test the main predictions of our model using an
administrative dataset created by linking the population of VAT and corporation tax records
in the UK for the period 2004-2014. One advantage of studying the UK’s VAT system is
that businesses below the registration threshold are not subject to any other tax to replace
the VAT, as is the case in many other countries.10 So, the UK gives us quite a clean test of
our theoretical predictions.
We first show that the pattern of voluntary registration in the data is consistent with
the theory. In particular, voluntary registration is more likely with a low share of B2C sales,
a high share of input costs, or when the industry is less competitive. Quantitatively, the
probability that a firm voluntarily registers for VAT is increased by 4 percentage points for
a one-standard deviation (s.d.) decrease in the share of B2C sales, by 4.9 percentage points
for a one-s.d. increase in the input-cost ratio, and by 3.9 percentage points for a one-s.d.
decrease in the Lerner index of competition. The results are robust to the use of either
a linear probability model or fixed-effects logit model, and to the inclusion of additional
firm-level control variables such as the distance to the VAT threshold.
We then look at bunching. In the aggregate, there is clear evidence of bunching at the
VAT threshold. To test the predictions from the model, we partition the sample into two
groups of firms based on their predicted likelihood of registering voluntarily, regardless of
whether their turnover is above or below the threshold. Focusing on the subset of firms that
are less likely to register voluntarily, we find that the bunching response is larger when (i)
the proportion of B2C sales is low, (ii) the cost of inputs relative to sales is high, or (iii)
9Predictions (i) and (ii) concerning bunching have been made informally (e.g. Brashares et al. (2014))
but to our knowledge, this is the first formal derivation of them. Predictions concerning the effect of market
competition on bunching, and on any determinants of voluntary registration, are to our knowledge, new.
10These businesses may still be liable for corporation tax (if they are incorporated) or income tax (if they
are sole-proprietorships or other kinds of businesses).
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when the Lerner index of their industry is low. In contrast, the bunching patterns for firms
that are highly likely to register voluntarily are unrelated to those three characteristics, as
expected. Thus, we conclude that the heterogeneous bunching patterns are consistent with
the theoretical predictions.
We further investigate some of the mechanisms underlying the registration decision.
There is some suggestive evidence that part of the bunching response is driven by eva-
sion, in the form of under-reporting of sales.11 We also analyze changes in registration status
in a dynamic regression setting. Specifically, we address the possibility that voluntary re-
gistration may not be an optimizing choice of firms, but simply a failure to deregister due
to inertia (or high deregistration costs) when sales fall below the threshold. Our empirical
findings suggest that, while there is some persistence in firm behavior, the decision is not
entirely driven by inertia.12
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews related literature.
Section 3 establishes the two stylized facts referred to in the introduction. Section 4 develops
the conceptual framework to analyze VAT bunching and voluntary registration. Section 5
derives the main empirical predictions. Section 6 provides an overview of the VAT system
in the UK and describes the data. Sections 7.1 and 7.2 present the empirical analysis for
voluntary registration and bunching, respectively. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, our work relates to the literature
on the effect of tax and regulatory thresholds, and in particular, the effect of VAT thresholds
on small business behavior. In an important paper, Keen and Mintz (2004) were the first
to set up a model of VAT including a threshold, and they show that there will be bunching
below the threshold. However, there are a number of differences between their approach and
ours. First, their model only allows for final consumer sales (B2C sales), which cannot by
itself explain voluntary registration, as argued above. Second, their main focus is on the
11The details of this exercise are reported on online Appendices B and D.
12See online Appendix E for details.
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optimal registration threshold, whereas our focus is on the coexistence and determinants of
voluntary registration and bunching. Kanbur and Keen (2014) extend the Keen and Mintz
(2004) framework to allow for VAT evasion and avoidance. A simplified version of our model
without B2B is closely-related to the framework in Keen and Mintz (2004), as explained in
more detail in Section 4.1 below. In a related paper, Brashares et al. (2014) use a calibrated
formula from Keen and Mintz (2004) to infer that for a 10 percent VAT rate, the optimal
level for the threshold in the United States is $200,000.
Second, there is a related literature on the relationship between the VAT and business
informality in developing countries (Emran and Stiglitz, 2005; de Paula and Scheinkman,
2010). In particular, de Paula and Scheinkman (2010) present a model where firms can
choose between formal and informal production, where the distinction is whether they must
register for VAT. Firms can also choose to buy inputs from formal or informal suppliers. In
their model, informality can be interpreted as producing below a VAT threshold. Moreover,
because they model two stages in the chain of production (upstream and downstream firms),
they allow for both B2C and B2B sales. Nevertheless, their model is not really suited to our
task because voluntary registration cannot occur in equilibrium, as there are only two stages
of production. The formal argument for this is further discussed in Section 4.1 and in the
online appendix.
Third, there is a small empirical literature on the effects of VAT registration thresholds in
different countries. Onji (2009) documents the effects of the introduction of a VAT threshold
in Japan, focusing on the incentives for a large firm to split in order to stay below the
threshold. More recent papers, appearing after the first version of this paper was completed,
document bunching of small firms at the VAT registration threshold in Finland (Harju et al.,
2016), as well as lack of bunching in response to the VAT threshold in Armenia (Asatryan
and Peichl, 2016).13 In particular, Harju et al. (2016) provide strong evidence of bunching
below the VAT threshold in Finland, and argue that compliance costs are the main driver.14
13The first version of the current study was published as a working paper in 2015 (Liu and Lockwood,
2015).
14There are several reasons that compliance costs may be more important in Finland than for our study.
First, the VAT threshold in Finland is very low, at e8,500 ($ 9,800), compared to well over $ 100,000 in the
UK over our study period. Other things equal, larger firms find compliance less costly. Second, in the UK,
all active companies are required to file company accounts and corporation tax returns, so they already have
the information required for the VAT return, and the VAT return itself is short and simple.
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However, neither of these papers studies the determinants of voluntary registration in detail,
nor do they develop a theoretical framework specific to the VAT.15
Our work also relates to the broader literature on tax notches (Slemrod, 2010; Kleven and
Waseem, 2013; Best and Kleven, 2018; Kopczuk and Munroe, 2015; Kleven, 2016; Almunia
and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018). As shown below, the “bunching equation” in this paper, which
relates the amount of bunching to the elasticity of the tax base and parameters of the
tax system, is mathematically very similar to the equation of Kleven and Waseem (2013).
However, for reasons discussed below, it is much more difficult to back out credible elasticity
estimates in the VAT case, and so we do not attempt this in the paper.
3 Two Stylized Facts
To motivate the theoretical analysis, we present two key stylized facts from our UK admin-
istrative dataset. The construction of the dataset is described in detail in Section 6.2. Here,
we just note that we have more than 3.4 million turnover observations above and below the
VAT threshold, for almost one million unique companies between April 1, 2004 and April 5,
2015.
The first fact is bunching of firm turnover just below the VAT registration threshold. We
normalize turnover by subtracting the threshold value so that the threshold is located at
zero in any year. The histogram of normalized turnover is shown in Figure 1, where there is
clear evidence of excess mass to the left of the registration threshold in an otherwise smooth
distribution. The figure indicates that the VAT registration threshold is binding for at least
a subset of British firms. We discuss the bunching estimates later, in section 7.2.
It is worth noting that the bunching spike is not as sharp as in other bunching studies,
in particular those studying firms’ responses to notches (e.g., Best et al., 2015; Almunia
15Harju et al. (2016) present formulae for the reduced-form elasticity implied by observed bunching which
are taken directly from Kleven and Waseem (2013). However, these formulae are originally developed for a
labour supply model, and are not directly applicable to the VAT due to the influence of input costs on the
incentives for registration. In an earlier version of our paper, (Liu and Lockwood, 2015), we show that to
apply the Kleven-Waseem formulae directly, one has to assume that all sales are B2C, firms are price-takers,
and the production function is fixed-coefficients. Moreover, the elasticity estimated is an output supply
elasticity, taking the price of output as given, not the elasticity of the tax base, because the latter will also
be determined by the elasticity of demand.
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and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018; Harju et al., 2016). One possible explanation is that firms
that benefit from voluntary registration, do not respond in any way to the location of the
threshold. Another potential reason is measurement error, because the registration threshold
is set in terms of VAT taxable turnover, but in the corporation tax records we cannot
distinguish domestic sales from exports. The latter suggests that our measures of bunching
should be interpreted as a lower bound of the true behavioral response. We explore these
hypotheses in more detail later in the paper.
The second stylized fact is that, in any given year, a significant number of firms are
registered for VAT even though their turnover is below the threshold in the current year.
On average, over our sample period, 43% of firms below the threshold are in this position.
Possibly, part of this may be due to rules of registration. In the UK, a business must register
for VAT if its taxable turnover is likely to go over the threshold in the next 30 days, or if its
taxable turnover in the previous 12 months was above the threshold. So, for example, a firm
may register on the basis of previous year’s turnover, and then its turnover may fall below
the threshold in the current year.
However, our data show that there is considerable persistence in registration below the
threshold. This is shown in Figure 2 which shows what happens to firms initially registered
and below the threshold during in 2004/5. Almost one-half are still registered three years
later, and over one-third are still registered five years later. So, it is likely that registration
below the threshold is a conscious decision by firms, rather than just due to inability to
forecast turnover one year in advance, or inertia. So, we refer to this stylized fact as voluntary
registration.
4 Conceptual Framework
Key Features of the Model. We aim to model the behavior of “small” firms selling to
both final consumers and to businesses, where both voluntary registration and bunching can
be equilibrium outcomes. As already explained in the introduction, the coexistence of these
two behaviors requires that the “small” firms make both B2B and B2C sales, and that they
buy produced inputs. So, as already remarked, the model must have (at least) three stages
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of production.16
Second, we wish to study the effect of the input cost ratio, share of B2C sales, and the
level of industry competition on voluntary registration and bunching, so the model must
incorporate parameters measuring these.
We construct the simplest general equilibrium model that has the required features.
There is a single representative consumer that supplies labour and buys two kinds of goods; a
differentiated good sold by the small firms, and a single good produced by a large downstream
firm. The large firm also buys inputs from the small firms, generating a B2B demand.
We assume that the large firm is operating at a scale where non-registration for VAT (i.e.
operating so that the value of sales are below the VAT threshold) is never profitable. Finally,
a homogeneous input to the small firm is produced by a third sector of upstream competitive
firms from a labour input via a constant returns technology. The behavior of this last sector
is summarized by a zero-profit condition that says that the price of the small-firm input is
equal to the wage. The structure of this economy is illustrated in Figure 3. Note that there
are three stages of production.
Consumers. There is a representative household that has preferences over the homogen-
eous good, consumed at level Y, a set of differentiated goods a ∈ [a, a], consumed at levels
x(a), a ∈ [a, a], and leisure l. These preferences are of the following form:
U(X) + V (Y ) + l, X =
[∫ a
a
(x(a))(eC−1)/eC da
]eC/(eC−1)
, eC > 1 (1)
where X is a CES index of differentiated products, and
U(X) = λ1/φ
X1−1/φ
1− 1/φ, V (Y ) = (1− λ)
1/γ Y
1−1/γ
1− 1/γ , φ > 0, γ > 1
Here, λ is a measure of the final demand by households for the goods produced by the
small firms relative to demand for the good produced by the large downstream firm; as such,
16Suppose that firms make only B2C sales. Then, it is easily shown that irrespective of the degree of
competition between firms, the cost of voluntarily registering exceeds the benefit, because the burden of VAT
paid on output when registered exceeds the burden of VAT paid on inputs when not registered. Conversely,
with only B2B sales, the voluntary registration is always optimal, because the burden of output VAT can be
passed on to the buyer. Both these points are made formally below.
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it will be the parameter that measures B2C demand in what follows.
Each differentiated good a is produced by a single small firm a, which can be either
registered for VAT or not. For reasons further discussed below, we allow the homogeneous
good Y to be subject to VAT or not. We also allow the firm to price-discriminate between
final and intermediate consumers, so let pC(a), pB(a) be the prices charged to final consumers
and the large firm respectively for good a, excluding VAT.
So, the household faces a budget constraint
P (1 + t)Y +
∫ a
a
[pC(a)(1 + I(a)t)]x(a)da = w(1− l) + Π (2)
where 1− l is labour supply, w is the wage, P is the price of the homogeneous good produced
by the large firm, and I(a) ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator recording whether the firm registers for
VAT or not, with a “1” indicating registration. So, if the firm is registered, the consumer
price is grossed up by VAT i.e. p(a)(1 + t). Finally, Π is aggregate profit, which can be
defined formally using (11) below; because utility is linear in leisure, there are no income
effects in demand for x(a), Y and so this term plays no further role.
So, by standard arguments, maximization of (1) subject to (2) gives household demand
for the homogeneous and differentiated goods:
Y = (1− λ)(1 + t)−γP−γ (3)
x(a) = λ
(
pC(a)(1 + I(a)t)
Q
)−eC
Q−φ (4)
where Q is the CES price index corresponding to the quantity index X i.e.
Q =
[∫ a
a
(pC(a)(1 + I(a)t))
1−eCda
]1/(1−eC)
(5)
We assume that in equilibrium, positive leisure is consumed, so that from (1), the wage is
fixed at the marginal utility of leisure, unity.
The Large Firm. The large firm combines inputs y(a), a ∈ [a, a] bought from the small
firms via a constant returns CES production technology to produce output Y. This production
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technology is characterized by a CES cost function per unit of output of
C =
[∫ a
a
(pB(a))
1−eB da
]1/(1−eB)
, eB > 1 (6)
where pB(a) is the price of the input net of tax (as the large firm is VAT-registered, it can
claim back any tax on inputs). So, the large firm chooses P to maximize (1 − λ)P−γ(P −
C). This gives the usual mark-up equation for price i.e.
P =
γ
γ − 1C (7)
and thus, combining (7),(3), ultimately, output is
Y = (1− λ)(1 + t)−γ
(
γ
γ − 1C
)−γ
(8)
Finally, input demand for variety a is, by Shephard’s Lemma and (8):
y(a) =
∂C
∂pB(a)
Y = (1− λ)(1 + t)−γ
(
γ
γ − 1
)−γ
C−γ
(
pB(a)
C
)−eB
(9)
The Small Firms. To keep things simple, we assume, following Keen and Mintz (2004),
that the production technology is fixed coefficients, with one unit of output for an a type
firm requiring ω/a units of the input, and (1 − ω)/a units of labour.17 The input costs are
w, r, where r is the cost of the input. By assumption, w = 1, and we have also assumed,
without loss of generality that one unit of the intermediate good requires one unit of labor,
so r = 1 also.
Let the unit cost function be denoted c(I(a); a), where I(a) is the variable recording
registration status. Then, under the assumptions just stated, the unit cost function is:
c(1; a) =
1
a
, c(0; a) =
1 + ωt
a
(10)
So, cost of the input is grossed up by the tax t if the firm is not registered, as the firm cannot
17All the results below generalize straightforwardly if the small firm production function is assumed as a
constant returns CES function of labor and the intermediate input.
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claim the input tax back. Note that a is a measure of productivity, and ω is a measure of
the firm’s use of intermediate inputs relative to labour, independently of productivity.
Suppressing the dependence of pC , pB, I and etc. on a to lighten notation, the firm’s
profit is
pi(pC , pB, I; a) = (pC − c(I; a))x+ (pB − c(I; a))y (11)
where from (4), (9):
x = λAC (pC(1 + I.t))
−eC , y = (1− λ)AB(pB)−eB (12)
where
AC = Q
eC−φ, AB = (1 + t)−γ
(
γ
γ − 1
)−γ
CeB−γ (13)
are parameters that the small firms take as given, but are determined in equilibrium.
The small firm chooses pC , pB ∈ [0,∞), I ∈ {0, 1} to maximize pi(pC , pB, I; a) subject
to the registration constraint, which says that if the firm chooses not to register (I = 0),
the value of sales s ≡ pCx + pBy must be less than the VAT sales threshold s∗. This allows
of course, for voluntary registration, which is defined by a choice I = 1 when s < s∗. The
costs and benefits of registration are clear from equations (11) and (12). The benefit is that
registration, I = 1, lowers the unit cost of production. The cost is that at a fixed price,
registration lowers B2C sales, because demand by the household is reduced by the tax.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium is (i) a price P for the homogeneous product given by (7);
(ii) for each a ∈ [a, a], prices pC(a), pB(a) and a registration decision I(a) that maximises
(11) subject to (12) and AC , AB fixed; (iii) demand shifts AC , AB in (13) that are functions of
pC(a), pB(a), I(a) via (6) and (5). It should be noted that this describes a general equilibrium
for the whole economy. Note that the equilibrium is conditional on fixed values of the share
of B2C sales, λ, the intensity of input use, ω, and demand elasticities eC , eB and we will vary
these parameters in what follows.
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4.1 Discussion
Here, we discuss some modelling choices. First, as already remarked, we allow the small
firms to price-discriminate between B2C and B2B customers. The reason for this is the
following. As long as the elasticities of demand from the household and the large firm are
different, i.e. eC 6= eB, the small firm prefers to price discriminate if it can. Moreover, ruling
out price discrimination is not very tractable, as the profit-maximising price cannot then
be solved for in closed form, unless it is assumed that eC = eB. However, for some results
(Proposition 2, parts (c) and (d), Propositions 4-b.1) we do assume eC = eB, so that given
this, the assumption of price-discrimination is without loss of generality.
Second, in practice, there are compliance costs to VAT registration. These can be intro-
duced at the cost of some additional complexity - see Section 5.4 below. However, it should
be noted that these costs are relatively small for the UK: for example, a recent literature
review found that at the registration threshold, these costs were around 1.5% of turnover,
declining to 0.1% or less for large companies (Federation of Small Businesses, 2010), and so
we do not feel it necessary to include these in our analysis.18
Third, it has been argued that the amount of output exported is a determinant of re-
gistration, because in practice, exports are exempt from VAT, and so firms exporting more
of their output are more likely to register (Brashares et al., 2014). Our model could be
interpreted to cover this case. This is because in the case of exports, the exporter does
not bear any of the burden of the output VAT, and so from the supplier’s point of view,
domestic B2B sales and exports are equivalent in this respect. So, we could interpret good Y
as being purchased by foreigners, rather than domestic consumers.19 Finally, in our baseline
model, we do not allow for evasion, to avoid overloading the analysis. We introduce evasion
in Section B.
Note that when λ = 1, our model is closely related to the Keen and Mintz model. Then,
both models have a set of firms of different productivity producing a good from labor and an
intermediate input, which they sell only to final consumers. The main differences are that we
18Also, empirically, there are no major changes in compliance requirements during our sample period.
19In that case, technically, we would have to replace the term 1 + t in (3) by 1 + t∗ where t∗ is the foreign
rate of VAT.
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have constant returns to scale and monopolistic competition, whereas in their model, firms
are perfectly competitive, facing a world producer price for the good, but have decreasing
returns to scale. But under both sets of assumptions, when λ = 1, the firms bear the burden
of output VAT to a point where voluntary registration is not desirable.
Note finally that our model has three stages of production; upstream, an input is pro-
duced, which is then sold to the small firms, who produce goods, some of which are then
sold as inputs to the downstream large firm. This is no accident; as argued in the introduc-
tion, it is clear that at least three stages are required to generate voluntary registration in
equilibrium. This observation explains why the model of de Paula and Scheinkman (2010),
which is elegant in many ways, is not suitable for our investigation, as it only has two stages
of production.20
5 Analysis
5.1 Necessary Conditions for Voluntary Registration and Bunch-
ing
As already argued above, the coexistence of both voluntary registration and bunching re-
quires that the “small” firms make both B2B and B2C sales. This is relatively easy to show
formally in our framework.21
Proposition 1 If all sales are B2C i.e. λ = 1, there is no voluntary registration. If all sales
are B2B, i.e. λ = 0, all firms register voluntarily, whatever their turnover, so there can be
no bunching. So, to observe both bunching and voluntary registration simultaneously, we
require that there are both B2C and B2B sales i.e. 0 < λ < 1.
20It may be asked why we did not develop a theoretical framework by adding a third stage to the de
Paula and Scheinkman model. We did not do this, for two reasons. First, because with this addition, it
is not clear that the algebra would be less burdensome than what we have. In particular, although their
model is very simple to write down, establishing comparative statics results is surprisingly difficult, as prices
are endogenous. In our setting with constant returns production technologies and prices being a constant
mark-up on marginal cost, comparative statics results are much more easily established. Second, their model
assume perfect competition, and so cannot be used for generating predictions about the effect of changing
market power.
21All proofs are in online Appendix A.
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Proposition 1 is in fact completely general; as shown in the online appendix, it does not
rely on our technical assumptions such as isoelastic demand or constant marginal cost. For
the remainder of the theoretical section of the paper, we thus focus on the general case where
0 < λ < 1.
Here, we face a problem; generally, AC , AB depend on equilibrium prices and this consid-
erably complicates the analysis. So, for the remainder of the theoretical Section, we assume
that eC = φ, eB = γ. This ensures that the demand parameters are exogenous i.e. from
(13), AC = 1, AB = (1 + t)
−eB
(
eB−1
eB
)eB
.
5.2 Voluntary Registration
We now turn to the registration decision, which is a choice I ∈ {0, 1}, with the firm then
maximizing profit given its registration decision. We begin by defining two crucial cost and
demand changes. First, from (10), the percentage increase in the firm’s unit costs due to
non-registration, because of input VAT, can be defined independently of firm productivity a
as
∆c =
c(0; a)
c(1; a)
− 1 = ωt. (14)
Call this the input VAT effect on cost.
Second, if eC = eB = e, we can define a similar kind of output VAT effect on demand.
Specifically, it is easy to calculate that any fixed price pC = pB = p, the percentage reduction
in overall demand for the firm’s product due to the charging of output VAT on B2C sales
is:22
∆d =
λ(1− (1 + t)−e)
λ+ (1− λ)(1 + t)−e( e−1
e
)e
> 0 (15)
This is because when output VAT is charged, at a fixed price p, all B2C sales (which
count for λ of the total) are reduced by a factor (1+ t)−e; call this the output VAT effect . We
can then show:
22To see this, note that from (12), at any fixed price p, the ratio of total demand with VAT registration
to without is
λ(p(1 + t))−e + (1− λ)ABp−e
λp−e + (1− λ)ABp−e =
λ(1 + t)−e + (1− λ)AB
λ+ (1− λ)AB
Using the fact that AB = (1 + t)
−e ( e−1
e
)e
, we see that this expression is equal to 1−∆d.
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Proposition 2 (a) A firm of type a will register voluntarily iff
aeB−eC ≥ λBC
(1− λ)BB
(1 + ∆c)
1−eC − (1 + t)−eC
1− (1 + ∆c)1−eB (16)
where BC , BB are exogenous demand shift parameters:
BC =
(
eC − 1
eC
)eC 1
eC − 1 , BB = (1 + t)
−eB
(
eB − 1
eB
)2eB 1
eB − 1 (17)
(b) If the voluntary registration condition (16) holds at λ, ω, it also holds at ω′ ≥ ω,
λ′ ≤ λ; that is, voluntary registration is more likely, the higher the input cost ratio, ω, and
the lower the share of B2C sales, λ.
(c) If eB = eC = e, (16) holds independently of a iff
T = (1−∆d) (1 + ∆c)e−1 ≥ 1 (18)
The voluntary registration condition is most easily interpreted in the form (18). There, it
says that if the input VAT effect on cost due to non-registration, ∆c, is large relative to the
output VAT effect, ∆d, there will be voluntary registration. Note also when eC = eB, T is a
sufficient statistic that captures the entire effect of the VAT system on voluntary registration.
We will see later that it is also a sufficient statistic for the degree of bunching. Note finally
that via (14), (15), T depends on the rate of VAT, t, and our three key parameters, the share
of B2C sales λ, the input cost ratio ω, and the elasticity of demand e.
The intuition for these results is the following. Generally, voluntary registration occurs
when output effect ∆d is small, and/or when the input VAT effect ∆c is large. The first
observation is that other things equal, the larger λ, the bigger is the output VAT effect ∆d;
this explains the fact that T falls with λ. Second, other things equal, the larger ω, the bigger
is the input VAT effect ∆c; this explains why T rises with ω.
It is also of interest to study how the level of competition, measured by e, affects voluntary
registration. Here, we assume that eB = eC = e. Then, we see from (14), (15), (18) that
there are two effects of a higher e, working in opposite directions.
First, the input effect, (1+ωt)e−1, is increasing in e, which captures the fact that the input
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VAT burden from non-registration rises with e, because the higher cost (due to embedded
VAT) is harder to pass on to both B2C and B2B consumers when demand becomes more
elastic. Second, the output effect in (18) is decreasing in e, and captures the fact that
the output VAT burden from registration rises with e, because the tax on output (due to
embedded VAT) is harder to pass on to B2C consumers when demand becomes more elastic.
As e becomes large, the output VAT effect becomes very strong. Specifically, as e→∞,
1 −∆d is proportional to 1/(1 + t)e, which dominates the input effect (1 + ωt)e−1. Hence,
eventually T → 0. In fact, we can prove:23
Proposition 3 In the competitive limit, as e→∞, voluntary registration is never optimal.
To get some further insights on the effect of e on the sufficient statistic, T , we report
some numerical simulations. Table 1 shows the value of T for as e increases, for different
combinations of λ and ω.
In the first row, the input cost ratio is very high, and the share of B2C sales is very
low. These are the conditions under which we expect voluntary registration (T > 1) to
occur, and indeed this is the case. Note here that T is not monotonic in e; it first rises and
then falls. This non-monotonicity is due to the fact that for low values of e, the effect of
increasing competition on the input VAT component of T can dominate the effect on the
output component of T . The second row is where both the input cost ratio and the share
of B2C sales are very high. Here, these two opposing forces always lead to a T below 1 that
is monotonically decreasing in T . The same qualitative picture as in the second row also
emerges when the input cost ratio is low, for both a low and high B2C ratio.
5.3 Bunching
Now consider what happens if T < 1. In this case, registration leads to a drop in profit for any
fixed value of sales. This implies that there must be an interval of firms, a ∈ [a∗, a∗ + ∆a∗],
who bunch by restricting the value of sales in order to stay at the VAT threshold. As demand
23The proof is simple. From (14), (15), (18) we see that for e large, T behaves like ( 1+ωt1+t )
e. But as ω < 1,
this term goes to zero as e→∞, and so T → 0 as e→∞.
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is elastic by assumption, i.e. e > 1, they do this by cutting price to keep sales low. The firm
at the bottom of this bunching interval, a∗, is the one that has a profit-maximising total
value of sales of exactly s∗ when not registered.
The firm at the top of the interval, a∗ + ∆a∗ is indifferent between restricting the value
of sales to s∗ and not registering, and registering and choosing price and thus sales without
any restriction. If pi(I; a) denotes optimized profit, conditional on the registration decision
I ∈ {0, 1} , this indifference condition can be written as
pi(1; a∗ + ∆a∗) = pi(0; a∗ + ∆a∗) (19)
So, the amount of bunching in the space of firms is measured by ∆a∗.
Now, we do not observe a but we do observe firm sales. Following Saez (2010) and Kleven
and Waseem (2013), we reason as follows. First, let s∗+ ∆s∗ be the value of sales of the firm
a∗+∆a∗, assuming that this firm does not have to register for VAT. So, ∆s∗ is the difference
in sales between the VAT threshold and what the value of sales for the firm at the top of the
bunching interval, a∗ + ∆a∗, would have been had it been unconstrained by the threshold.
So, following Saez (2010), the fraction of firms bunching, B, in the space of sales is given by
B =
∫ s∗+∆s∗
s∗
h(s)ds (20)
where h(s) is the distribution of firms in the space of sales, assuming that firms do not have
to register. Moreover, because each variety a is produced by a single firm, the distribution
of firms on the space of varieties is uniform on [0, 1], and so h(s) = 1/s, where s is the sales
of the highest-productivity firm, a = 1. So, from (20), we see B = ∆s
∗
s
.
As B is empirically observable, this means that our empirical predictions need to be
about the determinants of ∆s∗. In the online appendix, assuming eC = eB = e, we show 24:
24Note that (21) is closely related to the Kleven and Waseem (2013) formula relating bunching at a notch
of the personal income tax schedule to the elasticity of the labor supply. In particular, in their formula, the
tax notch is measured by the term ∆t/(1− t) where t is the lower rate of income tax, and ∆t is the increase
in the tax rate at the notch. In fact, it is easily verified if we take (21) and substitute eL = e− 1, where eL
is th elasticity of labor supply, replace ∆s∗/s∗ by ∆z∗/z∗, and replace T 1/e by 1− ∆t1−t , we get equation (5)
in their paper.
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Proposition 4 The amount of bunching at the VAT threshold ∆s∗ is given by the implicit
relationship
e
(1 + ∆s∗/s∗)
− (e− 1)
[
1
1 + ∆s∗/s∗
]e/(e−1)
− T = 0 (21)
where T < 1 is the VAT sufficient statistic.
Note that the entire effect of VAT on bunching is captured by the sufficient statistic
T. Note also that T < 1, because otherwise there would be voluntary registration. We can
now use (21) to look at some of the determinants of bunching. We have:
Proposition 5 The amount of bunching ∆s∗ rises (i) as the fraction of B2C sales, λ,
increases, and (ii) as the share of inputs in total cost, ω, falls. Moreover, if the sufficient
statistic T is decreasing in e, the amount of bunching ∆s∗ increases as e rises.
The intuition for (i) and (ii) is very similar to the case of voluntary registration. That
is, factors that make voluntary registration less attractive also provide incentives for staying
under the VAT threshold by bunching. Specifically, this will be the case when most customers
are not VAT-registered, so that the burden of an increase VAT can not easily be passed on
to the buyer, and/or when input costs are relatively unimportant relative to labour costs.
We will bring these predictions to the data below.
Finally, increased competition increases bunching as long as T is decreasing in e. While we
cannot establish analytically that T is decreasing in e, the simulation results reported above
indicate this is the case for a wide range of parameter values. The intuition here is again
related to the intuition with voluntary registration; increased product market competition
makes it harder for a firm to pass on output market VAT and thus increases the incentive
to bunch.
5.4 Evasion and Compliance Costs
Here, we briefly explain how our theoretical results extend to evasion and compliance costs.
First, VAT in the UK has been susceptible to fraud and avoidance, as in many other countries.
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According to HMRC estimates, the VAT tax gap, which is defined as the difference between
theoretical VAT liabilities and total VAT receipts on a timely basis, is currently around 10%
of theoretical VAT liability (HM Revenue and Customs, 2015). Some of this gap can be
accounted for by VAT debt owed by firms, and by sophisticated fraud schemes, but most of
the VAT gap is probably due to sales under-reporting and cost over-reporting.25
In online Appendix B, we model the simplest and most common form of VAT evasion,
under-reporting of sales. This has two aspects. First, as is widely recognized, a non-registered
firm can hide sales, for example by using cash transactions. However, it is also the case that
registered sellers can use this strategy, albeit at a higher cost of detection. We model both
these evasion strategies.
With evasion, it turns out that the qualitative effects of λ, ω, and e on T do not change,
and so our predictions about the determinants of voluntary registration and bunching do
not change. Therefore, our key empirical predictions are robust to the presence of evasion.
However, as already mentioned in Section 1, we do not measure evasion directly. Nor do
we have any obvious way of decomposing the total bunching effect into an evasion response
and a real response, although this can be done plausibly for business taxes in some other
countries, using special features of national tax systems.26 Our empirical strategy therefore
focuses primarily on identifying the effects of changes in the B2C ratio, input-cost ratio and
level of competition as predicted by the theory, without taking a view on how much of this
effect works through evasion. However, in online Appendix D, we do present some suggestive
evidence that firms under-report turnover to stay below the threshold.
Now suppose that there is a fixed compliance cost Γ > 0 for the firm if it registers. What
will the effect be on the equilibrium? If the voluntary registration condition condition (18)
above does not hold, so we are in the bunching regime, then firms continue to bunch, but
25For example, HM Revenue and Customs (2015) estimates that the total VAT gap in 2014-15 was 13.1
billion. Of this, at most £1.0 billion is due to Missing Trader Intra-Community fraud, £1.2 billion is VAT
debt, and finally £0.2 billion due to VAT avoidance. This means that over 80% of the gap is due to other
factors.
26For example, Best et al. (2015) use a minimum tax scheme for corporations in Pakistan which has a kink
point where the real incentive for bunching is small, but the evasion incentive is large, and they find large
bunching around the minimum tax kink. Waseem (2016), again for Pakistan, shows very large responses
when reforms cut the rate of income tax to zero for the self-employed, which he interprets as being largely
an evasion response.
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the upper end of the bunching interval is now described by
pi(1; a∗ + ∆a∗)− Γ = pi(0; a∗ + ∆a∗) (22)
Clearly, the larger Γ, the higher is the upper end of the bunching interval in (22), as firms
now have an incentive not only to avoid charging the output VAT but also the compliance
cost. If the voluntary registration condition condition (18) above does hold, then there are
two possibilities. If Γ is small enough, then even the least productive a-firm will choose to
register voluntarily and so part (c) of Proposition 2 continues to hold. If Γ is larger, then
low-productivity firms start to bunch.
6 Context and Data
6.1 The Value-Added Tax System in the UK
Approximately two million registered businesses remit value-added tax (VAT) in the UK
every fiscal year. The VAT is the third largest source of government revenue following
income tax and national insurance contributions. In 2017/18, the VAT raised £125.1 billion,
accounting for 21.1% of total tax revenue and 6.1% of GDP in the UK.27
VAT is levied on most goods and services provided by registered businesses in the UK,
goods and some services imported from countries outside the European Union (EU), and
brought into the UK from other EU countries. Key information about rates and thresholds
for VAT in the UK is given in Table 2. As can be seen from that Table, the standard VAT
rate in the UK was constant at 17.5% between April 2004 and January 2011, except for a
temporary reduction to 15% during the worst months of financial crisis (between December
2008 and January 2010). The standard rate was further raised to 20% in January 2011 and
has not been modified since then. A small number of goods and services have VAT levied
at a reduced rate of 5% and there are also goods and services that are zero-rated or exempt
from VAT altogether.28
27See www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hmrc-tax-and-nics-receipts-for-the-uk.
28The 5% reduced rate is charged on a small number of supplies under schedule 7A of the Value Added
Tax Act of 1994 (VATA). This mainly includes the supply of domestic fuel and power, the installation of
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All businesses must register for VAT if their taxable turnover is above a given threshold.29
In the case of the UK, the registration threshold is regularly updated to keep up with
inflation, as shown in Table 2.30 The UK has the highest registration threshold in the EU,
which is perceived as a way for the government to reduce the compliance costs of small
businesses not wishing to register for VAT.31
As is standard in most VAT systems, VAT-registered businesses pay VAT on their pur-
chases (input tax), and charge VAT on the full sale price of their taxable supplies (output
tax). Businesses with a turnover below the threshold may choose to register voluntarily in
order to recover the VAT paid on their intermediate inputs. Businesses cannot charge output
VAT on their sales of zero-rated or exempt goods. In the case of zero-rated supplies, the firm
can claim back the VAT paid on inputs, whereas the same is not true for exempt supplies.
In the specific case of the UK, there are two rules governing registration: a forward-
looking rule and a backward-looking one. Under the forward-looking rule, a business must
register for VAT if its taxable turnover is likely to go over the threshold in the next 30
days. Under the backward-looking rule, a business must register if its taxable turnover in
the previous 12 months was above the threshold. Strictly speaking, our theoretical model
is static and applies only to the forward-looking decision; that is, the business must register
if turnover in the current year is expected to exceed the threshold. In our sample, around
67.4% of first-time registers have a previous-year turnover lower than the VAT threshold.
This suggests that the forward-looking decision is the most relevant in practice.
energy saving materials, women’s sanitary products, children’s car seats and certain types of construction
work.
29Taxable turnover includes the value of any goods or services a business supplies within the UK, unless
they are exempt from VAT. All zero-rated sales, except exports, are included as part of the taxable turnover.
30Specifically, under Article 24(2)(c) of the sixth EC VAT directive (77/388/EEC 17 May 1977). These
provisions are now consolidated in the principal VAT directive (2006/112/EC); article 287 allows for States
to increase the registration threshold in line with inflation. As far as we are aware, there is no interaction
between the VAT registration threshold with other major taxes in the UK, not does it change the probability
of being audited for firms around the threshold.
31Small firms with annual taxable turnover above the registration threshold but below £150,000 can use
a simplified flat-rate VAT scheme. In 2007, only 16% of eligible firms were registered under the flat-rate
scheme (Vesal, 2013).
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6.2 Data
We construct our data by linking two administrative datasets: (i) the universe of VAT returns
and (ii) the universe of corporation tax records in the UK (called CT600). The first dataset
provides detailed information on VAT-registered businesses, which may take a variety of legal
forms including sole proprietorships, partnerships, and companies. To obtain information on
business not registered for the VAT, we link the VAT records to the population of corporation
tax records based on a common anonymized taxpayer reference number. The linked dataset
allows us to identify whether companies are registered in the VAT or not, and contains rich
information on VAT and corporation tax for each business and year.32
We further merge the linked tax dataset with two additional data sources: (i) the Finan-
cial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) annual company account database, which contains addi-
tional firm characteristics and accounting information and (ii) the annual sector-level statist-
ics on the share of sales to final consumers based on the Office of National Statistics’ (ONS)
Input-Output tables. The latter gives us an empirical proxy for λ, the share of sales that
are B2C at the 2-digit SIC industry level.
The final dataset contains 3,461,247 observations for 968,353 unique companies between
April 1, 2004 and April 5, 2015.33 For each company-year observation, we have information
on the VAT-exclusive turnover taken from the corporate tax records, and whether the com-
pany is registered for VAT.34 We examine several key factors that drive firms’ decisions about
32Note that this linked dataset does not include sole proprietorships or partnerships that are below the
VAT threshold and have chosen to not register for VAT. These types of business are taxed through the
individual income tax. The data on the universe of self-assessment taxpayers is available (it has been used
recently by Almunia et al. (2017). However, this dataset does not have an identifier to link individual
taxpayers to the VAT records.
33We take several steps to refine the sample to study the VAT registration decisions of individual companies.
First, we eliminate companies which are part of a larger VAT group and focus only on standalone independent
companies. This is because companies under common control–for example, subsidiaries of a parent company–
can register as a VAT group and submit only one VAT return for all companies in a VAT group. Second,
we drop all observations with partial-year tax or accounting records because the registration decision can
be based on turnover in the previous 12 months. We further eliminate companies that mainly engage in
overseas activities based on the HMRC trade classification. This is because the taxable VAT turnover
excludes exports. We exclude companies/organizations that are non-profit making because they may have
specific objectives that are different from other companies. Online Appendix F provides details on how we
construct our sample.
34Our empirical analysis is based on turnover reported in the CT600 for two reasons. The first is data
availability, as we only observe VAT-liable turnover for firms that are registered for VAT. The second is
related to salience, given that firms that are not registered for VAT are more likely to base their registration
decision on the overall amount of turnover, instead of computing a separate measure of turnover that is
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voluntary registration, including the share of input costs relative to total turnover (input-
cost ratio), the share of sales to final consumers (B2C sales ratio), firm-specific history of
registration, and the degree of industry-level competitiveness.
The CT600 data contains an aggregate measure of input costs that includes both salaries
and other inputs. Therefore, the input cost ratio derived from this dataset is higher than the
magnitude relevant in our setting. The FAME dataset does report salaries and other inputs
separately, but only 7 percent of the firms in our study sample have non-missing salaries in
FAME, severely limiting our sample size. To obtain a measure of the input cost ratio closer
to the theory, we extrapolate from the subset of firms in the FAME dataset. Specifically,
we rescale the input-cost ratio reported in the CT600 data to match the mean and standard
deviations observed for each industry in the FAME data.
For the industry competitiveness measure, we use the Lerner index of competition. This
is defined as one minus the average ratio of trading profit to value of sales for firms in a given
industry. It is easily checked that if demand is iso-elastic at e, for all firms in an industry,
as it is in our theoretical model, the Lerner index is simply (e− 1)/e. This means that the
Lerner index is an ideal measure for testing our predictions about the effect of competition
as measured by e.35
Notice that the input cost ratio varies at the firm level, while the share of B2C sales
and the Lerner index vary at the 2-digit and 4-digit industry level respectively. All three
variables have annual variation, allowing us to include them in the panel regressions with
fixed effects that we present in the next section.
We focus on two different subsamples to test hypotheses developed in Section 5. When
studying the voluntary registration decision, we include all firms with turnover below the
current-year VAT registration threshold to examine the choice of voluntary registration. We
define a firm as voluntarily registered if it is registered in the current year, and (1) has never
registered before and has a turnover below the VAT threshold, or (2) if it was registered
in the previous year and has a turnover below the VAT deregistration threshold. For the
subject to VAT.
35Other commonly used measures of competition are the four-firm concentration ratio, or the Herfindahl
index, but they measure the relative importance of the largest firms in an industry, and are not closely
related to the demand elasticity faced by small firms close to the VAT registration threshold.
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bunching analysis, we include all firms with turnover in the range between £50,000 below
the current-year registration threshold and £100,000 above. In this larger sample, 69.5% of
firms have a turnover below the VAT threshold, of which 42.9% are registered for VAT. So,
overall, 29.8% of firms in the main sample of companies are voluntarily registered.
6.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3 reports summary statistics for companies in the neighborhood of current-year VAT
notch, i.e. those with nominal turnover of between £10,000 and £200,000. We report the
mean, standard deviation, various percentiles (10th, 50th and 90th) and the number of non-
missing observations for the key variables used in empirical analysis. Firms in the final
dataset have £74,690 of average turnover and £21,880 of trading profit. The average salary-
inclusive input cost ratio (using data from CT600) is 71% of total turnover, while the average
salary-exclusive input cost ratio (using data from FAME for a subsample of firms) is 38%.
The input cost ratio calculated with the extrapolation procedure explained above yields an
average of 48%, which is in between but closer to the FAME subsample, as expected. The
average share of B2C sales is 55%, and the average Lerner index is 0.75.36
7 Results
We present two sets of empirical results. For voluntary registration, we estimate a linear
probability model with firm and year fixed effects focusing on firms with turnover below
the VAT registration threshold. The regression equation includes the share of business-
to-consumer sales (B2C), the input cost ratio (ICR), the Lerner index as a proxy for the
competitiveness of the industry and the distance from the registration threshold. In the
bunching analysis, we use graphical evidence and standard nonparametric techniques to
estimate the excess bunching mass just below the threshold. We then investigate whether
the amount of bunching varies with the three key variables mentioned above in the way
predicted by the theory.
36Recall that the share of B2C sales and the Lerner index vary at the industry-year level, but here we
report the firm-year level averages.
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7.1 Voluntary Registration
We examine whether the decision to voluntarily register for the VAT is consistent with the
three theoretical predictions stated in Propositions 2 and 3: a firm is more likely to register
voluntarily for VAT if it sells mostly to other VAT-registered businesses (as opposed to final
consumers), has a larger share of intermediate input costs (relative to total costs), or operates
in a more competitive industry.
We evaluate these relationships more formally using a panel regression framework. We
model the decision of voluntary registration as a binary choice model of the following form:
Rit = αi + αt + γ1B2C
j
it + γ2ICRit + γ3L
j
it + γ4Dit + υit, (23)
where Rit is a dummy indicator that takes value 1 if the firm is voluntarily registered and
zero otherwise. B2Cjit denotes the share of B2C sales in industry j where firm i operates in
year t, ICRit denotes the input-cost ratio for firm i in year t, and L
j
it is the Lerner index
for competitiveness for industry j in year t. Additionally, we control for the distance to the
VAT threshold, Dit, defined as the difference between total turnover and the registration
threshold in year t. The time-invariant firm fixed effects and year dummies are denoted by
αi and αt, respectively, and υit is a random error term.
We estimate equation (23) using a linear probability model, which allows us to include
firm fixed effects without a bias due to the incidental parameters problem.37 The estimation
sample includes all firms with turnover below the current-year VAT registration threshold.
According to Proposition 2, we expect to obtain γ1 < 0, γ2 > 0 and γ3 < 0.
Table 4 reports the estimation results from the linear probability model.38 The first four
columns include year dummies but not firm fixed effects, which allows us to examine the
total effect of the industry-level variation in the B2C sales ratio and the Lerner index on the
probability of voluntary registration. We first include each of the three key variables one at
a time (columns 1-3), and then include them all together in column 4. The coefficients in the
37The predicted values are all within the (0, 1) interval, indicating that the main drawback of the linear
probability model is not a concern in this setting.
38The estimation results from a conditional logit model with fixed effects are very similar and are available
from the authors upon request.
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letter column are -0.17 for B2C sales, 0.20 for the input cost ratio and -0.36 for the Lerner
index, all statistically significant at the one percent level. These coefficients are consistent
with the predictions from our theoretical framework, and similar to those in columns (1)-(3).
In columns (5)-(8), we include firm fixed effects and follow the same progression as before.
The fixed effects absorb a substantial part of the cross-sectional variation in the industry-
level variables and reduce the size of their coefficient estimates. While all coefficients are
statistically significant and have the expected signs in columns (5)-(7), the coefficient on the
share of B2C sales becomes essentially zero in column (8). In that last specification, the
coefficient on the input cost ratio is 0.064, and the one on the Lerner index is -0.214, both
statistically significant.
One advantage of including firm fixed effects is that they partially control for inertia in
registration status, by controlling for whether a firm has previously been above the regis-
tration threshold. However, including firm fixed effects also absorbs part of the variation
underlying the predictions in our theoretical framework. This is because some of the charac-
teristics that affect the incentives to register voluntarily, in particular the share of B2C sales
and the input cost ratio, are fairly stable over short periods of time. Thus, it is not sur-
prising that the coefficients decrease in size in the fixed-effects specification. While neither
specification (with or without fixed effects) is flawless, we think the regression without fixed
effects represents the best possible test of our theoretical predictions.
Therefore, we evaluate the size of the effects focusing on column (4), our preferred spe-
cification. Given these results, the likelihood of being registered voluntarily is on average
4.0 percentage points higher as the B2C ratio decreases by one standard deviation (s.d.),
4.9 percentage points higher as the input-cost ratio increases by one s.d., and 3.9 percentage
points higher as the Lerner index decreases by one s.d. These are sizable effects that confirm
the importance of these three variables in the firms’ decision to register voluntarily for VAT.
Table 5 reports similar specifications using the two alternative measures of the input cost
ratio. Columns (1)-(4) use the measure from the CT600 dataset, and columns (5)-(8) use
the measure from the FAME dataset, for the subsample of firms observed. All the coefficient
estimates are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4, and they are all statistically significant
except for the coefficient on the share of B2C sales in the fixed-effects specifications (4 and
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8). We conclude that the results are robust to the use of alternative measures of the input
cost ratio.
Dynamic Behavior One potential limitation of the above analysis is that we do not
explicitly consider the dynamic behavior of firms. A change in the registration status involves
some costs to firms, raising the possibility that firms who are initially above the registration
threshold and later fall below may stay registered simply to avoid the cost of deregistration.
Hence, some of the firms who seem to be voluntarily registered may just be behaving in
this way because of inertia. As noted above, the firm fixed effects partially control for this
type of behavior. As a further robustness check, we conduct additional regressions taking
into account these dynamic effects. Specifically, we estimate a probit model with random
effects where we include a lag of the dependent variable (i.e., whether the firm was registered
the previous year), the initial registration status, and the averages of the key explanatory
variables. A more detailed explanation of these regressions and the results can be found in
the online appendix.
7.2 Bunching Evidence
7.2.1 Estimation Method
As explained in Section 4, the VAT registration threshold at the cutoff turnover value s∗
will induce excess bunching at the threshold by companies for which voluntary registration
is not optimal. From (20), we can write bunching as B = ∆s∗h(s∗), where h(s∗) is the
counterfactual density of firms over the bunching interval, assuming that this is constant.
Following Kleven and Waseem (2013), We will express this as a fraction of the counterfactual
density of firms at the notch, so our empirical measure of bunching is
b =
s∗∑
j=s∗−
(cj − ĉj)
1
N
s∗∑
j=s∗−
ĉj
. (24)
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Here, cj is the actual number of firms in each £1,000 turnover bin, and ĉj is the counter-
factual bin counts without the notch. The range
(
s∗−, s
∗
+
)
specifies turnover bins around the
notch where bunching occurs and are therefore excluded from predicting the counterfactual
distribution. Specifically, the lower bound of the excluded turnover region, s∗−, is set at
the point where excess bunching starts. The upper bound of the excluded region, s∗+, is
estimated in an iteration procedure to ensure that the excess mass below the VAT notch is
equal to the missing mass above.39 Finally, N is the number of bins in the excluded range(
s∗−, s
∗
+
)
.
So, to summarize, equation (24) says that the excess mass is empirically measured by the
difference between the predicted and actual mass of firms in the excluded range, divided by
the average counterfactual density of firms in that range.
7.2.2 Graphical Evidence
This section presents evidence of bunching below the VAT notch using the main sample
of companies with turnover in a range between £45,000 below and £100,000 above the
registration threshold. Figure 1 shows the distribution of turnover for all companies in that
range, pooling together data from fiscal year 2004/05 through 2014/15. Following Chetty
et al. (2011) and Kleven and Waseem (2013), we estimate the counterfactual distribution
by fitting a flexible polynomial of order 5 to the empirical distribution, excluding a range
around to the VAT notch.40
Two points are worth noting in Figure 1. First, the VAT notch creates evident bunching
39We follow the standard procedure to estimate the counterfactual distribution. By grouping companies
into bins of £1,000, we estimate the counterfactual distribution of turnover around the VAT notch s∗ in the
following regression:
cj =
q∑
l=0
βi (sj)
l
+
s∗+∑
i=s∗−
γiI {j = i}+ εj , (25)
where cj is the number of companies in turnover bin j, sj is the distance between turnover bin j and the
VAT notch s∗, q is the order of the polynomial, and I {·} is an indicator function. The error term εj reflects
misspecification of the density equation.
40As a robustness check, we have tried values between 4 and 7 for the order of the polynomial and our
results are not significantly changed (available on request). The excluded range goes from -£14,000 to
£24,000, which ensures that the excess bunching mass to the left of the notch is almost identical to the
missing mass to the right. As in Kleven and Waseem (2013), the upper bound of the excluded region is
estimated using an iterative procedure to ensure that the area under the estimated counterfactual density is
equal the area under the observed density.
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below the threshold. The bunching estimate is 1.361 (std. error: 0.202), meaning that
the total excess bunching mass is almost 1.4 times as large as the average height of the
counterfactual over the excluded range.41 Second, in contrast with the large spike at the
threshold, there is only a small hole in the distribution above the VAT notch. We do not
attempt to estimate the magnitude of optimization frictions implied by the missing mass to
the right of the notch for the various reason discussed in section 4.
Kleven (2016) argues that, in the context of the personal income tax, bunching is much
more likely to be due to evasion, rather than to real earnings responses. Here, as already
noted, both evasion and real responses may be driving observed bunching. We do not
attempt to decompose observed bunching into real and evasion responses because there is
no variation that allows us to do that. In the online appendix, we show some suggestive
evidence that the bunching behavior may partly be due to misreporting of turnover.
7.2.3 Heterogeneity in Bunching
We now explore potential heterogeneity in bunching to see whether the empirical patterns
are consistent with the predictions set out in Proposition 5. Implementing this analysis is
challenging because some firms have incentives to voluntarily register for VAT, and therefore
are indifferent to the existence of the VAT threshold. To address this issue, we leverage
the fact that we observe which firms choose to register voluntarily among those below the
threshold. Specifically, we partition the sample into two groups of firms based on their
predicted likelihood of registering voluntarily (regardless of their turnover) following three
steps. First, we regress voluntary registration status on the three key variables (share of
B2C sales, input cost ratio and Lerner index), including only firms below the turnover
threshold. Second, we use the estimated coefficients to obtain a predicted probability of
being voluntarily registered for each firm i in year t. Third, we divide firms into two groups
depending on whether their predicted probability is above or below the median.
First, we explore how companies with different shares of B2C sales respond to the same
41Bunching is sharp and significant every year, as shown in earlier versions of this paper (e.g., Liu and
Lockwood, 2015). Unlike to studies analyzing bunching in the taxable income of individuals (Kleven and
Waseem, 2013) and corporations (Devereux et al., 2014), we do not find any evident bunching at round
numbers.
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VAT notch. We divide companies into four quartiles of the B2C share distribution and
estimate bunching at the VAT registration threshold for the subsamples of firms more and
less likely to register voluntarily. The top panel of Figure 4 shows the bunching estimates
and 95-percent confidence intervals for each quartile of the B2C share distribution, for firms
predicted to not register voluntarily (i.e., the subgroup for which the VAT notch is binding).
The bunching estimate is positively correlated with the share of B2C sales, taking a value of
0.5 for the first quartile (Q1) and about 1.4 for the fourth quartile (Q4). The bottom panel
of Figure 4 shows the equivalent estimates for the subgroup of firms predicted to register
voluntarily, for whom the VAT threshold is not binding. In this case, the bunching estimates
are consistently low, between 0.3 and 0.6, and they do not follow any clear pattern across
quartiles.
Second, we examine the extent of bunching depending on the degree of competition in
the product market, measured by the Lerner index at the 4-digit industry level. Since this
index is defined as one minus the average profit margin in the industry, higher values of the
index indicate that the industry is more competitive. As in the previous cases, we examine
how bunching varies across quartiles of the Lerner index distribution for firms predicted to
register vs. not. The top panel of Figure 5 shows a strong positive correlation between the
bunching estimates and the degree of competition for firms predicted to not register, with an
estimate of 1.7 for firms in the top quartile (Q4). When studying firms predicted to register
voluntarily in the bottom panel of Figure 5, we observe consistently low bunching estimates
at all four quartiles without any specific pattern.
Finally, we examine how companies with different input cost ratios respond to the VAT
notch. Again, we divide the sample into quartiles of the distribution of this variable, and
look separately at firms predicted to register voluntarily vs. those not predicted to register.
For this test, we use the input cost ratio constructed using information from the FAME
subsample. The top panel of Figure 6 shows that the degree of bunching generally decreases
with the input cost ratio for firms predicted to not register voluntarily, although the rela-
tionship is not fully monotonic because the estimate for the first quartile is relatively low.
In the bottom panel of Figure 6, we observe that the pattern of bunching estimates is flat
for firms predicted to register voluntarily, again confirming that, as expected, the model’s
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predictions do not apply to that group of firms.
8 The VAT Threshold
We conclude by discussing some of the implications of our work for the setting of the VAT
threshold. The well-known work of Keen and Mintz (2004) makes clear that the basic trade-
off in choosing the threshold is between minimizing administration costs for the revenue
authority and compliance costs for businesses (implying a high threshold) and raising VAT
revenue (implying a low threshold). On top of this, they show that behavioral responses to
the threshold also affect threshold design.
In the online appendix, we develop a formula for the optimal threshold in our model
which refines their basic insight in two ways. First, it allows for a behavioral response that
is specific to our model. Second, it also allows for B2B sales, a feature not present in Keen
and Mintz (2004). We find that the optimal threshold in the presence of B2B sales (λ < 1)
is higher than in the absence of B2B sales.42
The intuition for this result is that only B2C sales by small firms above the threshold are
taxed in our model, whereas the value of B2B sales to the large firm is eventually taxed, as
all of the large firm’s sales are taxed. This implies that raising the threshold is less costly in
terms of forgone tax revenue when more of the sales of the small firm are B2B. This intuition
is further developed in online Appendix C.
While our formula is obviously specific to our model, the mechanism at work is likely
to be more general, i.e. for a variety of different market structures, B2B sales are more
likely to eventually be taxed than B2C sales.43 In order to test this, we have compiled some
cross-country empirical evidence. Figure 7 shows the cross-country relationship between the
average ratio of B2C sales in a country and the ratio of the VAT threshold in year 2017 over
GDP per capita.44 We focus on this ratio to adjust for the relative size of turnover by small
42A fuller analysis of the optimal threshold is beyond the scope of this paper, as it would require calibration
of the model. We leave this as a topic for future work.
43There is also a second, more indirect mechanism at work in our model with B2B sales. An increase in
the threshold increases the prices that the small firms who are bunching charge for inputs to the large firm,
and this is passed on to prices by the large firm, increasing the VAT base. See online Appendix C for details.
44Specifically, the B2C ratio is calculated as the final sales to consumers, including sales to households, non-
profit institutions serving households, and governments, relative to total sales to industries and consumers
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businesses in countries at different levels of development. Moreover, the size of the informal
sector might also influence the choice of threshold. We proxy the latter by the share of the
agricultural sector in GDP, following Keen and Lockwood (2010).
The empirical pattern in Figure 7 is quite intriguing and consistent with the model
prediction in the online Appendix C. There is a positive correlation between the average
B2C ratio and the VAT threshold as a fraction of per-capita GDP (Panel A). The estimated
slope coefficient is 0.06 and is significant at the 10 percent level (with a p−value of 0.089).
However, when controlling for the size of informal sector, the relation between the average
B2C ratio and the VAT threshold normalized by GDP per capita becomes negative, with the
slope coefficient estimated to be -0.03 and highly significant (with a p−value of 0.005). As a
large informal sector (proxied by the share of agriculture sector) is typically associated with
higher compliance and administration costs, the patterns suggest that the VAT threshold
tends to be higher with higher compliance and administration costs and less direct selling
to consumers.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we first developed a conceptual framework which can explain the co-existence
of voluntary VAT registration and bunching at the registration threshold. We showed that
this required (at least) three stages of production, with firms at the intermediate stage
selling both to final consumers and to other firms. This framework predicts that voluntary
registration is more likely, and bunching is less likely, when (i) the cost of inputs relative to
sales is high, (ii) when the proportion of B2C sales is low, or (iii) when the level of product
market competition is low. Additionally, evasion opportunities will generally make voluntary
registration more likely, while having an ambiguous effect on bunching.
We then brought these predictions to an administrative dataset that was created by
linking the population of corporate income and value-added tax records in the UK. We found
that voluntary registration is more likely with a low share of B2C sales, a high input-cost
in each of the 103 countries. The cross-country input/output data is from the multi-region input-output
table (MRIO) of the Eora global supply chain database, available at https://worldmrio.com/eora26/.
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ratio, and more competition in the industry. Moreover, there is clear evidence of bunching
at the VAT threshold. Consistently with the theory, there is a clear pattern of heterogeneity
in bunching; the amount of bunching is increasing in the B2C sales ratio, and decreasing in
the input-cost ratio and the level of competition in the industry. In the last section of the
paper, we provided a discussion and some cross-country evidence of the implications of our
results for the optimal design of the VAT threshold.
34
References
Almunia, Miguel and David Lopez-Rodriguez, “Under the Radar: The Effects of
Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
2018, 10 (1), 1–38.
, Ben Lockwood, and Kimberley Scharf, “More Giving or More Givers? The Effects
of Tax Incentives on Charitable Donations in the UK,” 2017. working paper, University
of Warwick.
Asatryan, Zareh and Andreas Peichl, “Bunching and Non-bunching of Firms at VAT
and Admin Thresholds,” 2016. working paper, University of Mannheim.
Best, Michael and Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, “Housing Market Responses to Transac-
tion Taxes: Evidence from Notches and Stimulus in the UK,” Review of Economic Studies,
2018, 85, 157–193.
Best, Michael Carlos, Anne Brockmeyer, Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Johannes
Spinnewijn, and Mazhar Waseem, “Production versus Revenue Efficiency with Lim-
ited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan,” Journal of Political Economy,
2015, 123 (6), 1311–1355.
Brashares, Edith, Matthew J. Knittel, Gerald Silverstein, and Alex Yuskavage,
“Calculating the Optimal Small Business Exemption Threshold for a U.S. VAT,” National
Tax Journal, 2014, 67 (2), 283 – 320.
Chetty, Raj, John N. Friedman, Tore Olsen, and Luigi Pistaferri, “Adjustment
Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from
Danish Tax Records,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011, 126 (2), 749–804.
de Paula, Aureo and Jose Scheinkman, “Value-Added Taxes, Chain Effects, and In-
formality,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, October 2010, 2 (4), 195–221.
Devereux, Michael P., Li Liu, and Simon Loretz, “The Elasticity of Corporate Taxable
Income: New Evidence from UK Tax Records,” American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 2014, 6 (2), 19–53.
Ebrill, Liam P., Michael Keen, Jean-Paul Bodin, and Victoria P. Perry, The
Modern VAT, International Monetary Fund, November 2001.
35
Emran, M. Shahe and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “On selective indirect tax reform in developing
countries,” Journal of Public Economics, April 2005, 89 (4), 599–623.
Federation of Small Businesses, Impact of Increasing VAT Registration Threshold for
Small Businesses, Centre for Economics and Business Research, June 2010.
Harju, Jarkko, Tuomas Matikka, and Timo Rauhanen, “The Effects of Size-Based
Regulation on Small Firms: Evidence from VAT Threshold,” 2016. working paper, VATT
Institute for Economic Research.
HM Revenue and Customs, Measuring Tax Gaps, HM Revenue and Customs, March
2015.
Kanbur, Ravi and Michael Keen, “Thresholds, Informality, and Partitions of Compli-
ance,” International Tax and Public Finance, 2014, 21 (4), 536–559.
Keen, Michael and Ben Lockwood, “The value added tax: Its causes and consequences,”
Journal of Development Economics, 2010, 92 (2), 138–151.
and Jack Mintz, “The Optimal Threshold for a Value-Added Tax,” Journal of Public
Economics, 2004, 88 (3-4), 559–576.
Kleven, Henrik, “Bunching,” Annual Review of Economics, 2016, 8.
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen and Mazhar Waseem, “Using Notches to Uncover Optim-
ization Frictions and Structural Elasticities: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2013, 128 (2), 669–723.
Kopczuk, Wojciech and David Munroe, “Mansion Tax: The Effect of Transfer Taxes
on the Residential Real Estate Market,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
May 2015, 7 (2), 214–57.
Liu, Li and Ben Lockwood, “VAT Notches,” May 2015. CEPR Discussion Paper 10606.
Onji, Kazuki, “The Response of Firms to Eligibility Thresholds: Evidence from the Ja-
panese Value-Added Tax,” Journal of Public Economics, June 2009, 93 (5-6), 766–775.
Saez, Emmanuel, “Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?,” American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 2010, 2 (3), 180–212.
36
Slemrod, Joel, “Buenas Notches: Lines and Notches in Tax System Design,” 2010. working
paper, University of Michigan.
Vesal, Mohammad, “Optimization Frictions in Choice of the UK Flat Rate Scheme of
VAT,” Memeo, London School of Economics September 2013.
Waseem, Mazhar, “Using Movement of Exemption Cutoff to Estimate Tax Evasion: Evid-
ence from Pakistan,” 2016. working paper, University of Manchester.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., “Simple Solutions to the Initial Conditions Problem in Dynamic,
Nonlinear Panel Data Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity,” Journal of Applied Eco-
nometrics, 2005, 20 (1), 39–54.
37
Figures
Figure 1. Turnover Distribution around the Registration Threshold
Notes: This figure shows the histogram of companies’ turnover net of current-year VAT registration
threshold (normalized VAT notch) by pooling data between 2004/05-2014/15. The bin width is
£1,000 and the red line denotes the normalized VAT notch. The dashed line is counterfactual
density fitted by excluding bins around the VAT notch.
Figure 2. Persistence of Registration Below the Threshold
Notes: This figure plots the transition probability for firms voluntarily registered during 2004/05-
2009/10, to remain registered and below the threshold, registered and above the threshold or
deregistered, in the following years. Firms leave the sample when they are dissolved or become
part of a larger VAT group in following years.
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Figure 3. Structure of the Economy
Notes : this figure shows the key features of the economy in which we model behavioral
responses of firms with respect to the VAT threshold, including voluntary registration and
bunching.
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Figure 4. Bunching across Quartiles of the B2C Share Distribution
(a) Binding VAT Threshold (b) Nonbinding VAT Threshold
Notes: the figure shows the bunching estimates around the VAT notch across four different
quartiles of the distribution of the share of B2C sales for the pooled dataset for period
2004/05-2014/15. Panel (a) shows the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals
for the subset of firms not predicted to register voluntarily. Panel (b) shows the estimates for
the subset of firms predicted to register voluntarily, for whom the threshold is nonbinding.
Figure 5. Bunching across Quartiles of the Lerner Index Distribution
(a) Binding VAT Threshold (b) Nonbinding VAT Threshold
Notes: the figure shows the bunching estimates around the VAT notch across four different
quartiles of the distribution of Lerner Index for the pooled dataset for period 2004/05-
2014/15. Panel (a) shows the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for the
subset of firms not predicted to register voluntarily. Panel (b) shows the estimates for the
subset of firms predicted to register voluntarily, for whom the threshold is nonbinding.
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Figure 6. Bunching across Quartiles of the Input-Cost Ratio Distribution
(a) Bunching Evidence (b) Bunching Estimates
Notes: the figure shows the bunching estimates around the VAT notch across four different
quartiles of the distribution of Input-cost Ratio for the pooled dataset for period 2004/05-
2014/15. Panel (a) shows the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for the
subset of firms not predicted to register voluntarily. Panel (b) shows the estimates for the
subset of firms predicted to register voluntarily, for whom the threshold is nonbinding.
Figure 7. VAT Threshold and B2C Ratio: Cross-Country Evidence
(a) Raw Correlation (b) Controlling for the Size of Informal Sector
Notes: the figure shows the observed correlation between the B2C sales ratio and the VAT
threshold across 103 countries in 2017. Panel A controls for the influence of GDP per capita,
expressing the VAT threshold as a fraction of GDP per capita in each country. Panel B
further controls for the size of the informal sector, by regressing the VAT threshold as a
fraction of GDP per capita on the share of agriculture sector in each country and plotting
the residual against the B2C sales ratio.
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Tables
Table 1. The Effect of Competition on the Sufficient Statistic T
e 2 5 10 20 50 100
ω = 0.9, λ = 0.1 1.039 1.408 1.967 2.361 1.564 0.678
ω = 0.9, λ = 0.9 0.826 0.796 0.739 0.629 0.381 0.164
ω = 0.1, λ = 0.1 0.898 0.786 0.530 0.148 0.001 0.000
ω = 0.1, λ = 0.9 0.714 0.444 0.199 0.039 0.000 0.000
Notes : the table shows how the value of the sufficient statistic T varies with the elasticity
of demand (e), the share of B2C sales (λ) and the input cost ratio (ω).
Table 2. Value-Added Tax System in the UK
Registration Deregistration Standard Flat-Rate Scheme
Fiscal Year Threshold (£) Threshold (£) Rate (%) Threshold (£)
2004-05 58,000 56,000 17.5 150,000
2005-06 60,000 58,000 17.5 150,000
2006-07 61,000 59,000 17.5 150,000
2007-08 64,000 62,000 17.5 150,000
Apr 1, 2008-Nov 30, 2008 67,000 65,000 17.5 150,000
Dec 1, 2008-Mar 30, 2009 67,000 65,000 15.0 150,000
Apr 1, 2009-Dec 31, 2009 68,000 66,000 15.0 150,000
Jan 1, 2010-Mar 30, 2010 68,000 66,000 17.5 150,000
Apr 1, 2010-Jan 3, 2011 70,000 68,000 17.5 150,000
Jan 4, 2011-Mar 31, 2011 70,000 68,000 20.0 150,000
2011-2012 73,000 71,000 20.0 150,000
2012-2013 77,000 75,000 20.0 150,000
2013-2014 79,000 77,000 20.0 150,000
2014-2015 81,000 79,000 20.0 150,000
Notes : the table shows changes in the registration threshold, deregistration threshold,
Flat-Rate scheme threshold, and VAT standard rate over recent fiscal years. For
more information on the UK VAT tax system, see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/vat/forms-
rates/rates/rates-thresholds.htm. For the values of past registration thresholds, see
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/vat-notice-7001-should-i-be-registered-for-
vat/vat-notice-7001-supplement–2.
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Table 3. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean St.Dev. p10 p50 p90 Observations
Total Turnover 74.69 48.88 19.88 62.70 151.80 3461247
Trading profit 21.88 27.25 0.00 11.82 59.71 3461247
Total Input Costs (CT600) 52.81 44.27 12.04 36.55 123.46 3461247
Intermediate Input Costs (FAME) 31.34 33.79 2.00 18.00 82.00 238838
Input-Cost Ratio (CT600) 0.71 0.28 0.28 0.78 1.00 3461247
Input-Cost Ratio (FAME) 0.38 0.25 0.04 0.37 0.73 238838
Input-Cost Ratio (Adj) 0.48 0.24 0.11 0.53 0.77 3024673
Share of B2C Sales 0.55 0.24 0.29 0.45 0.91 3461247
Lerner Index 0.75 0.11 0.58 0.77 0.90 3461247
VAT Registered 0.630 0.483 0 1 1 3461247
VAT Registered (below threshold) 0.429 0.495 0 0 1 2405144
Notes: this table shows the mean, standard deviation, the 10th, 50th (median) and 90th
percentiles, and the number of nonmissing observations of the key variables used in the
empirical analysis. The top four variables are expressed in thousands of pounds (GBP),
where 1 GBP = 1.29 USD as of September 2018. The rest of variables are defined to be in
the interval [0, 1]. Note that we only have data on salary-exclusive input costs for a subset of
companies from the FAME dataset. The input-cost ratio (Adj) is constructed by normalizing
input-cost ratio (CT600) to match the mean and standard deviation of input-cost ratio
(FAME) at industry level. The share of B2C sales denotes the proportion of turnover that
comes from sales to final consumers, as opposed to sales to other VAT-registered businesses.
VAT Registered is indicator for companies registered for VAT, and VAT Registered (below
threshold) is that defined for companies below registration threshold.
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Table 4. Determinants of Voluntary VAT Registration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share of B2C Sales -0.233*** -0.167*** -0.025** 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011)
Input-Cost Ratio 0.153*** 0.204*** 0.064*** 0.064***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Lerner Index -0.417*** -0.356*** -0.195*** -0.214***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 2405144 2143833 2405144 2143833 2405144 2143833 2405144 2143833
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table presents estimation results from the binary choice model of VAT registration
based on equation (23). The dependent variable is the binary indicator of VAT registration
status that takes on the value 1 if a firm is voluntarily registered for VAT and zero otherwise.
Columns (1)-(4) present results from the linear probability model without firm-fixed effects,
and columns (5)-(8) present results by adding firm-fixed. The input-cost ratio is the adjusted
measure - input-cost ratio (CT600) normalized to match the mean and standard deviation
of input-cost ratio (FAME) at industry level. Additional firm-level control variables include
distance to the registration threshold. *,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
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Table 5. Determinants of Voluntary VAT Registration - other Input cost measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share of B2C Sales -0.192*** -0.004 -0.158*** 0.028
(0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.033)
Input-Cost Ratio 0.070*** 0.139*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.220*** 0.287*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Lerner Index -0.341*** -0.226*** -0.696*** -0.163***
(0.007) (0.015) (0.026) (0.056)
Observations 2405144 2405144 2405144 2405144 156571 156571 156571 156571
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Cost-Ratio Source CT600 CT600 CT600 CT600 FAME FAME FAME FAME
Notes: this table presents estimation results from the binary choice model of VAT registra-
tion based on equation (23). The dependent variable is the binary indicator of VAT regis-
tration status that takes on the value 1 if a firm is voluntarily registered for VAT and zero
otherwise. Columns (1)-(2) present results from the linear probability model without firm-
fixed effects with input-cost ratio (CT600), and columns (3)-(4) present results by adding
firm-fixed effects. Column (5)-(6) present results without firm-fixed effects with input-cost
ratio (FAME), and columns (7)-(8) present results by adding firm-fixed effects. Additional
firm-level control variables include distance to the registration threshold. *,**,*** denotes
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
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A Theoretical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. First, assume only B2C sales i.e. λ = 1. In this case, the firm
chooses pC , pB to maximize (11) subject to (12),(13). This is easily solved to give price as
a mark-up over cost i.e. pC =
eC
eC−1c(I; a) and thus profit for non-registered and registered
firms respectively is
pi(0; a) = BC(c(0, a))
1−eC , pi(1; a) = BC(c(1, a))1−eC
1
(1 + t)eC
(A.1)
where BC = AC
(
eC−1
eC
)eC
1
eC−1 . So, we only need show that pi(0; a) > pi(1; a). But, from
(A.1), (10), this holds iff
(
c(0, a)
c(1, a)
)1−eC
= (1 + ωt)1−eC >
1
(1 + t)eC
Now note that as eC > 1,
(1 + ωt)1−eC ≥ (1 + t)1−eC > (1 + t)−eC
as required.
Next, assume only B2B sales i.e. λ = 0. Then, it is easily checked profit is (p −
c(I; a))ABp
−eB . So, here, the argument is even simpler; cost is decreasing, and therefore
profit is increasing, if I = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (a) If registered, the firm chooses pC , pB to maximize (11) subject
to (12),(13) when I = 1. This is easily solved to give prices as a mark-up over cost i.e.
pC =
eC
eC − 1c(1; a), pB(a) =
eB
eB − 1c(1; a). (A.2)
Substituting A.2 back into the profit function (11), and using AC = 1, AB = (1 +
t)−eB( e−1
e
)e, we can derive the following formula for maximized profit:
pi(1; a) = λBC(1 + t)
−eCc(1; a)1−eC + (1− λ)BBc(1; a)1−eB (A.3)
Next, if not registered, the firm chooses pC , pB to maximize (11) subject to (12),(13) when
I = 0, subject also to the constraint pCx+pBy ≤ s∗ that the total value of sales is below the
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threshold. Now consider voluntary registration. A necessary and sufficient condition for this
is that profit with registration is greater than profit without, ignoring the constraint that
sales be below the threshold. We will assume that a firm will register if indifferent, to break
the tie. Solving this problem ignoring the threshold, following the steps for the registered
firm, we get maximized profit of
pi(0; a) = λBCc(0; a)
1−eC + (1− λ)BBc(0; a)1−eB (A.4)
Then, the voluntary registration condition is pi(1; a) ≥ pi(0; a). After some simple re-
arrangement, using (A.3),(A.4), this reduces to (16).
(b) We only need show that the RHS of (16) is increasing in λ and decreasing in ω. The
statement for λ is obvious by inspection. For ω, note first that 1 + ∆c ≡ 1 +ωt is increasing
in ω. So, both (1 + ∆c)
1−eC , (1 + ∆c)
1−eB are decreasing in ω as eC , eB > 1. Finally, note
that as ∆c > 0, eB > 1, 1 − (1 + ∆c)1−eB > 0. So, the RHS of (16) is decreasing in ω as
required.
(c) If eB = eC = e, (16) rearranges to
λ(1 + t)−e + (1− λ)B
λ+ (1− λ)B (1 + ∆c)
e−1 > 1, A =
BB
BC
= (1 + t)−e(
e− 1
e
)e (A.5)
But then from (15), it is clear that the first term on the left-hand side of (A.5) is 1−∆d, so
we obtain (18), as required. 
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) First, we characterize the relationship between firm type and
sales, under the assumption that the firm does not have to register for VAT. From (12), the
optimal price and total sales (B2C and B2B) of a non-registered firm are;
p(a) =
e
e− 1c(0; a) =
1 + ∆c
a
, s(a) = (λ+ (1− λ)AB)(p(a))1−e (A.6)
Combining these two expressions to substitute out p(a), we see that the relationship we need
between firms type and sales is:
s = (λ+ (1− λ)AB)
(
e(1 + ∆c)
e− 1
)1−e
ae−1 (A.7)
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(ii) We now write the indifference condition (19) that determines a∗ + ∆a∗ explicitly in the
space of sales. To To lighten notation, and using eC = eB = e, define
A0 = λ+ (1− λ)AB, A1 = λ(1 + t)−e + (1− λ)AB
First, from (A.3), and using the restriction that eC = eB = e, a firm that registers has
maximized profit:
pi(1; a) = A1
(
e
1− e
)−e
ae−1
1− e (A.8)
Next, the profit from being just at the VAT threshold for an a−type when constrained is
pi(0; a) = s∗ − 1 + ∆c
a
s∗
p
(A.9)
But solving for p from the constraint A0p
1−e = s∗, we get p =
(
s∗
A0
)−1/(e−1)
. Substituting
this back into (A.9), and using a = a∗ + ∆a∗, we get
pi(0; a∗ + ∆a∗) = s∗ − 1 + ∆c
A
1/(e−1)
0 (a
∗ + ∆a∗)
(s∗)e/(e−1) (A.10)
Then combining (A.7), evaluated at a = a∗ + ∆a∗, and (A.10), we get:
pi(0; a∗ + ∆a∗) = s∗ − 1 + ∆c
A
1/(e−1)
0 (a
∗ + ∆a∗)
(s∗)e/(e−1) (A.11)
= s∗ − (s∗)e/(e−1)
(
e− 1
e
)
(s∗ + ∆s∗)1/(1−e)
Again using (A.7), evaluated at a = a∗ + ∆a∗, in (A.8), we get:
pi(1; a∗ + ∆a∗) = A1
(
e
1− e
)−e
1
1− e(a
∗ + ∆a∗)e−1 (A.12)
=
A1
A0
(
e
1− e
)−e
1
1− e
(
e (1 + ∆c)
e− 1
)e−1
(s∗ + ∆s∗)
=
T
e
(s∗ + ∆s∗)
So, using (A.12),(A.11), the indifference condition pi(1; a∗+ ∆a∗) = pi0(0; a∗+ ∆a∗) becomes
s∗ − (s∗)e/(e−1)
(
e− 1
e
)
(s∗ + ∆s∗)1/(1−e) − T
e
(s∗ + ∆s∗) = 0 (A.13)
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After some simplification of (A.13) (divide through by s∗, then 1 + ∆s
∗
s∗ , and multiply by e)
we get (21) as required. 
Proof of Proposition 5. First, (21) can be rewritten as
f(x, e)− T (λ, ω, e) = 0, f(x) ≡ ex− (e− 1)xe/(e−1), x = 1
(1 + ∆s ∗ /s∗) (A.14)
So, from (A.14):
dx
dλ
=
Tλ
fx
,
dx
dω
=
Tω
fx
,
dx
de
=
Te − fe
fx
(A.15)
Moreover, note that
fx = e(1− x1/(e−1)) > 0 (A.16)
because x < 1, and e > 1, so x1/(e−1) < 1. Also, we know that Tλ < 0, Tω > 0 and so from
(A.15), (A.16), we conclude that dx
dλ
< 0, dx
dω
> 0. As x is an inverse measure of bunching, it
follows that as λ increases, ∆s∗ rises, and ω rises, ∆s∗ falls.
Finally, from (A.15),
fe = x− xe/(e−1) − (e− 1)d(x
e/(e−1))
de
= x− xe/(e−1) − lnx
e− 1x
e/(e−1)
So, for fe > 0, we require
x−1/(e−1) > 1 +
lnx
e− 1
But as x < 1, lnx < 0, so we require x1/(e−1) < 1, which certainly holds as x < 1 and
1/(e− 1) > 0. So, we conclude that fe > 0. It then follows from (A.15) ,(A.16), that dxde < 0
as long as Te < 0. But then bunching increases if Te < 0, as claimed. 
Proof that Voluntary Registration is Not Possible in the de Paula and Scheink-
man (2010) Model
We follow the notation of their paper. There are two kinds of firms, upstream firms, and
downstream firms. An informal downstream firm is by definition, not registered for VAT, and
get gets profit piN = maxx≤x{θdxα−pix}, where x is sales, x is the registration threshold, and
pi is the price of the input of bought from an upstream informal firm. If this firm registers,
it gets profit piR = maxx{(1 − τ)(θdxα − pfx)}, where τ is the rate of VAT, and pf > pi is
the cost of buying from the formal sector. Voluntary registration involves registering at a
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turnover (say x0 < x), giving profit (1− τ)(θdxα0 − pfx0). But then, as τ > 0, pf > pi;
piR = (1− τ)(θdxα0 − pfx0) < θdxα0 − pfx0 < θdxα0 − pix0 ≤ piN
so that the downstream firm can do better by not registering. Now consider an upstream
firm in their model. This firm gets piN = min θu, x if not registered, and piR = (1 − τ)θu if
registered. So, such a firm registers voluntarily iff θu < x. But, for such a firm, piN = θu >
(1− τ)θu = piR; again, the downstream firm can do better by not registering.
General Proof that Voluntary Registration is not Possible with Only B2C Sales
Consider a firm facing a residual demand function from final consumers of x(q), where q is
the consumer price. This covers both the cases of monopoly, where x(.) is also the actual
demand curve, and monopolistic competition, where x(.) is demand for that firm’s product,
taking the prices of all other firms as fixed. Assume all sales are to final consumers i.e. B2C.
If a firm is registered for VAT, profit is then
piR(p) = px(p(1 + t))− c(x(p(1 + t)), w, r)
where p is the producer price, and c(x, w, r) is the cost function given output x, and prices
of labour and the intermediate input w, r. This is completely general cost function that
clearly includes the cost function in the paper as a special case. If the firm is not registered
for VAT, profit is
piN(p) = px(p)− c(x(p), w, r(1 + t))
Then, we have
piR = max
p
{px(p(1 + t))− c(x(p(1 + t)), w, r)}
= max
q
{
q
1 + t
x(q)− c(x(q), w, r)
}
=
1
1 + t
max
q
{qx(q)− (1 + t) c(x(q), w, r)}
< max
q
{(q − c(x(q), w, r(1 + t)))}
= piN
So, with only B2C sales, no firm would every wish to register voluntarily.
vi
B Extended Model with VAT Evasion
Here, we model the simplest and most common form of VAT evasion, under-reporting of sales.
This has two aspects. First, a non-registered firm can hide a share of sales, for example by
using cash transactions. It is widely believed that the VAT chain makes it more difficult to
conceal sales to other registered businesses, so we will assume that only that a share νN of
B2C sales can be hidden. Then, sales can be s high as s∗ + νNpx without registering for
VAT.
We also allow registered sellers can use this strategy, albeit at a higher cost of detection.
So, suppose that such a seller does not charge VAT on some proportion νR of B2C sales px.
The total cost of x units of the good to the household, if purchased from a registered seller,
will be
νRxp+ (1− νR)xp(1 + t) = xp(1 + (1− νR)t).
That is, the household faces an average price of p(1 + (1− νR)t), and the firm continues to
get revenue p on every unit sold to the household.
We will assume that νN , νR are exogenously fixed, both for simplicity, and also because
there are some analytical issues in endogenizing them.45 The main qualitative points will
extend to the endogenous case.46 We will assume that 0 ≤ νR ≤ νN < 1, reflecting the fact
that non-registered firms are less likely to be audited than registered ones.
It is then easily verified that for voluntary registration, the analysis proceeds much as
before except that the VAT sufficient statistic becomes
T (ν) = (1−∆d(νR))(1 + ∆c)e−1, ∆d(νR) = λ(1− (1 + (1− νR)t)
−e)
λ+ (1− λ)AB (B.17)
Thus, with evasion, the output VAT effect depends on νR and is smaller than without evasion
i.e. ∆d(νR) < ∆d(0). This is intuitive; with some VAT evaded on sales, output VAT becomes
less of a burden. It then follows that T is increasing in νR i.e. voluntary registration is more
likely, the greater the opportunities for evasion, as measured by νR.
As regards bunching, evasion has two opposing effects. First, evasion relaxes the con-
straint imposed by the VAT threshold, as the tax authority only observes 1 − νN of B2C
45For example, suppose that the registered firm chooses νR to maximize profit minus evasion cost g(νR). It
is easily verified that optimized profit is convex in νR, as it only depends on νR via the term (1+t(1−νR))−e,
which is a convex function of νR. So, to have an interior solution, g(.) also has to be sufficiently convex in
νR. But then, a closed-form solution for νR cannot be found.
46For example, suppose the cost of evasion is linear in ν, up to a limit ν < 1. Then, as profit is convex in
ν, as explained in the previous footnote, and the evasion cost is small, the firm will always choose ν, so that
it is effectively exogenous.
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sales, and so the firm can in fact produce over the threshold without registering. Second, as
just discussed, if νR > 0, evasion makes registration less costly, because output VAT becomes
less of a burden.
Both of these effects appear formally as follows. With evasion, we show below that the
term T in the bunching equation (21) is replaced by
Tˆ (νN , vR) =
(1− νN)λ+ (1− λ)AB
λ+ (1− λ)AB T (νR) (B.18)
and in particular, positive bunching will occur when Tˆ (νN , νR) is less than 1.
47 An increase
in νN has the expected effect of lowering Tˆ and thus increasing bunching, as a higher νN
makes it less costly for the firm to hold its observed sales under the threshold. An increase in
νR has the opposite effect of reducing bunching, via the fact that T (νR) rises; this captures
the effect that evasion reduces the burden of output VAT.
Note that, with evasion, the qualitative effects of λ and ω on T do not change, and so
our predictions about the determinants of voluntary registration do not change; this is clear
by inspection from (B.17). This is also true of bunching; it is seen by inspection that Tˆ is
decreasing in λ, and increasing in ω, as is T . So, our key empirical predictions are robust to
the presence of evasion. We can summarize as follows:
Proposition b.1 An increase in evasion by non-registered firms, νN , increases bunching.
An increase in evasion by registered firms, νR, raises the likelihood of voluntary registration
and reduces bunching. Moreover, evasion does not affect our qualitative predictions about
the effects of λ, the fraction of B2C sales, and input-cost ratio, ω, on voluntary registration
and bunching.
Derivation of the Bunching Equation with Evasion
The proof follows the proof of Proposition 4 in the paper, with the following changes. First,
we define A0, A1 as
A0(ν) = λ(1− νN) + (1− λ)AB, A1(ν) = λ(1 + (1− νR)t)−e + (1− λ)AB
47For a formal proof, see below.
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As in (A.3) in the paper, any firm that registers has maximized profit:
pi(1; a) = A1(νR)
(
e
1− e
)−e
ae−1
1− e (B.19)
Next, the payoff from being on the VAT threshold for an a−type when constrained is now
pi(0; a) = (s∗ + νpx)− 1 + ∆c
a
(s∗ + νpx)
p
(B.20)
This is because the firm can actually produce and sell s∗ + νpx with a threshold s∗ because
sales νpx are ”cash” and thus not observable by the tax authority. Solving for p from the
definition that non-concealed sales must be equal to s∗ i.e. ((1−νN)λ+(1−λ)AB)p1−e = s∗,
we get:
p =
(
s∗
(1− νN)λ+ (1− λ)AB
)−1/(e−1)
Combining this with the fact that x = λp1−e, we get
s∗ + νpx = s∗
λ+ (1− λ)AB
(1− νN)λ+ (1− λ)AB ≡ µs
∗
Substituting this back into (B.20), and setting a = a∗ + ∆a∗, we get
pi(0; a∗ + ∆a∗) = µ
(
s∗ − 1 + ∆c
(A0(vN))1/(e−1)(a∗ + ∆a∗)
(s∗)e/(e−1)
)
(B.21)
Also observed non-cash sales map into type by
s∗ + ∆s∗ = A0(vR)
(
e (1 + ∆c)
e− 1
)1−e
(a∗ + ∆a∗)e−1 (B.22)
Combining (B.21) and (B.22), we get:
pi(0; a∗ + ∆a∗) = µ
(
s∗ − 1 + ∆c
(A0(vN))1/(e−1)(a∗ + ∆a∗)
(s∗)e/(e−1)
)
(B.23)
= µ
(
s∗ − (1 + ∆c) (s∗)e/(e−1)
(
e− 1
e (1 + ∆c)
)
(s∗ + ∆s∗)1/(1−e)
)
= µ
(
s∗ − (s∗)e/(e−1)
(
A0(vR)
A0(vN)
)1/(e−1)(
e− 1
e
)
(s∗ + ∆s∗)1/(1−e)
)
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Now using (B.22) in (B.19), we get:
pi(1; a∗ + ∆a∗) = A1(vR)
(
e
1− e
)−e
1
1− e(a
∗ + ∆a∗)e−1 (B.24)
=
A1(vR)
A0(vR)
(
e
1− e
)−e
1
1− e
(
e(1 + ∆c)
e− 1
)e−1
(s∗ + ∆s∗)
=
A1(vR)(1 + ∆c)
e−1
A0(vR)
(s∗ + ∆s∗)
e
= T (vR)
(s∗ + ∆s∗)
e
(B.25)
So, using (B.24),(B.25), the indifference condition pi(1; a∗+ ∆a∗) = pi0(0; a∗+ ∆a∗) becomes
s∗ − (s∗)e/(e−1)
(
e− 1
e
)
(s∗ + ∆s∗)1/(1−e) − T (vR)
µ
(s∗ + ∆s∗)
e
= 0 (B.26)
After some simplification of (B.26) (divide through by s∗, then 1 + ∆s
∗
s∗ , and multiply by e)
we get (21) in the paper with the tax term T (vR)
µ
as required. 
C The Optimal VAT Threshold
In this section, we show how a formula for the optimal VAT threshold can be derived for our
model. Following Keen and Mintz (2004), we assume that any firm that is registered has to
pay a compliance cost Γ > 0 and the revenue authority incurs an administration cost A > 0.
To keep things, simple, we will also assume that eC = eB = e, so pC(a) = pB(a) = p(a).
As a first step, it is helpful to rule out parameter values under which all firms choose to
register voluntarily. As discussed in Section 5.4, this situation arises when Γ is small enough,
and condition (18) in the paper holds. Then, even the least productive a-firm will choose
to register voluntarily, so the location of the registration threshold s∗ becomes irrelevant to
firm behavior, government revenue and welfare. Thus, we assume that either; (i) (18) does
not hold, or (ii) (18) does hold, and Γ is large enough to cause some firms to bunch.
Let the firm at the top of the bunching interval be a∗+∆a∗ ≡ aˆ for convenience. Then aˆ is
defined by condition (22) in the paper. Note for future reference that aˆ is strictly increasing
in s∗, as the higher the threshold, the high the productivity of the firm that is just willing
to cut output to stay below the threshold. We do not need to solve for the details of this
relationship in what follows, we just need to recall that ∂aˆ
∂s∗ > 0.
We focus on the choice of the VAT threshold to maximize tax revenue, to bring out the
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basic issues. The VAT base, which is taxed at rate t, is
B = PY +
∫ a
aˆ
p(a)x(a)da+ ω
∫ a
aˆ
x(a) + y(a)
a
da (C.27)
This is composed of three terms; the value of final sales to the household of the large firm,
the value of final sales of the registered small firms, and the value of inputs purchased by
non-registered small firms. Revenue is therefore
R = tB − (a− aˆ)A (C.28)
where A is the administration cost per firm of implementing the VAT, and (a − aˆ) is the
measure of firms that are registered.
To further study this expression, we note that the price p(a) charged by the firms in
equilibrium is as follows:
p(a) =

e
e−1
1
a
, a > aˆ(
Ω
s∗
)1/(e−1)
, a∗ ≤ a ≤ aˆ
e
e−1
1+ωt
a
, a < a∗
(C.29)
where Ω = λ + (1 − λ)AB. The explanation is as follows. For firms a > aˆ, the price is a
fixed mark-up over marginal cost of 1/a. The same is true for firms a < a∗, except that now
marginal cost is (1 + ωt)/a, due to embedded VAT. For firms in the bunching interval, the
price is set to just satisfy demand, while making the total value of sales equal to s∗ i.e. p(a)
must satisfy p(a)(x(a) + y(a)) = s∗; using (12), (13), and solving for p gives the formula
(C.29). Finally, in what follows, define p(s∗) ≡ (Ω
s∗
)1/(e−1)
.
Next, we note that from (6), (8) in the paper, and using e = γ, gives
PY = (1− λ)(1 + t)−e
(
e
e− 1C
)1−e
= (1− λ)AB
∫ a
a
(p(a))1−e da (C.30)
So, combining (C.29), (C.30):
PY = (1− λ)AB
[
(p(s∗))1−e(aˆ− a∗) +
∫ a
aˆ
(p(a))1−e da+
∫ a∗
a
(p(a))1−e da
]
(C.31)
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Also, using the fact that for a∗ ≤ a ≤ aˆ, x(a) + y(a) = s∗/p(s∗), we can write:∫ aˆ
a
x(a) + y(a)
a
da =
s∗
p(s∗)
∫ aˆ
a∗
1
a
da+
∫ a∗
a
x(a) + y(a)
a
da (C.32)
So, combining (C.31),(C.32) and (C.27), we get:
B = (1− λ)AB
[
(p(s∗))1−e(aˆ− a∗) + ∫ a
aˆ
(p(a))1−e da+
∫ a∗
a
(p(a))1−e da
]
+
∫ a
aˆ
p(a)(x(a))da+ ω s
∗
p(s∗)
∫ aˆ
a∗
1
a
da+ ω
∫ a∗
a
x(a)+y(a)
a
da
(C.33)
Now, consider the effect of a change in the threshold on the tax base B. When s∗ changes,
it changes the endpoints of the bunching interval a∗, aˆ. It also changes the prices via (C.29).
Some of these effects will be zero, because the price function p(a) is continuous in a, and also
B is continuous in a∗, aˆ with one exception; at aˆ, the terms in the integrands in the second
and third terms of (C.33) are generally not equal. In fact, the first is the value of final sales
for the aˆ firm, and the second is the overall cost of production for the aˆ firm, which will be
smaller. So, differentiating (C.33), and integrating the term
∫ aˆ
a∗
1
a
da explicitly, we get
∂B
∂s∗ =
(
ω
aˆ
s∗
p(s∗) − p(aˆ)x(aˆ)
)
∂aˆ
∂s∗
+ p′(s∗)
[
(1− λ)AB(1− e)(p(s∗))−e(aˆ− a∗)− ω s∗(p(s∗))2 ln
(
aˆ
a∗
)]
+ ω
p(s∗) ln
(
aˆ
a∗
)
(C.34)
Now from (C.29) and (12), it is easy to establish the following:
p′(s∗) =
p(s∗)
s∗(1− e) , p(aˆ)x(aˆ) = λp(aˆ)
1−e =
λs∗
Ω
(C.35)
Combining (C.34), (C.35), after some simplification, we get
∂B
∂s∗ =
(
ω
aˆ
s∗
p(s∗) − (1− β)s∗
)
∂aˆ
∂s∗ + β(aˆ− a∗)
+ e
(e−1)
ω
p(s∗) ln
(
aˆ
a∗
) (C.36)
where β ≡ (1−λ)AB
λ+(1−λ)AB is the share of demand for the bunching firms that is B2B.
Now using (C.28), we see that the optimal threshold for maximizing revenue is charac-
terized by
∂R
∂s∗
= t
∂B
∂s∗
+ A
∂aˆ
∂s∗
= 0 (C.37)
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Combining (C.36) and (C.37), we get the FOC that defines the optimal threshold:
∂R
∂s∗
=
(
t
ω
aˆ
s∗
p(s∗)
− t(1− β)s∗ + A
)
∂aˆ
∂s∗
+ tβ(aˆ− a∗) + t e
(e− 1)
ω
p(s∗)
ln
(
aˆ
a∗
)
= 0 (C.38)
To interpret this, and make the link to Keen and Mintz (2004), we proceed as follows. In
deriving their simple analytical formula, equation (2) in their paper, Keen and Mintz assume
no behavioral responses i.e. no bunching (which can be captured here by e = 0), and they
also assume no B2B sales i.e. β = 0. Making these two simplifications in (C.38), we can
write
∂R
∂s∗
= (−ts∗v + A) ∂aˆ
∂s∗
= 0, v = 1− ω
aˆp(s∗)
(C.39)
where v is the share of value added in sales for the aˆ firm. Solving (C.39) for s∗ gives
s∗ =
A
tv
(C.40)
This is exactly the formula in Keen and Mintz (2004) for the threshold in the special
case where the government maximizes revenue48 This formula is very intuitive; the higher
are administrative costs A, the higher the threshold should be, and the higher is the tax
rate t or the share of value-added (the tax base) for the firm at the threshold, the lower the
threshold will be, as reducing it will increase revenue proportionately to tv.
More generally, we can solve (C.38) for s∗ to get a generalization of the Keen and Mintz
formula:
s∗ =
A+ t
(
β(aˆ− a∗) + e
(e−1)
ω
p(s∗) ln
(
aˆ
a∗
))
/ ∂aˆ
∂s∗
t (v − β) (C.41)
This formula tells us that introducing either B2B sales tends to raise the threshold. 49
This is straightforward to see mathematically from (C.41): if not all sales are B2C i.e. β > 0,
then first, a positive term in β appears in the numerator of (C.41), and second, a negative
term in β appears in the denominator. Both of these make s∗ higher.
The intuition is as follows. First, an increase in s∗ increases PY by increasing the prices
that the small firms who are bunching charge for inputs to the large firm, and this raises B.
This is captured by the term in β in the numerator of (C.41), which is proportional to the
48This is their equation (2), in the limit as δ, the weight on revenue, goes to infinity, which is s∗ = A/tv
in our notation.
49It can also be seen that the effect of a behavioral response i.e. e > 0 on the threshold is positive. This
is most easily seen by setting β = 0 in (C.41) to get the special case of only B2C sales. Then, the term
in e/(e − 1) is positive. This is a somewhat different finding from Keen and Mintz (2004), who find an
ambiguous effect of the behavioral response on the threshold
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mass of bunching small firms, β(aˆ− a∗).
Second, an increase in s∗ raises a∗ and therefore the number of firms who bunch. This in
turn decreases the net VAT paid by bunching firms, as more firms now below the threshold.
But, the size of this effect depends on B2B sales. Specifically, this reduction is proportional
to the value of B2C sales minus the value of inputs used to produce all sales. So, the higher
are B2B sales, the smaller this effect is, and thus the lower the revenue cost of raising s∗.
This explains the term in β in the denominator in (C.41).
D Evidence of Bunching via Turnover Misreporting
In this section, we provide some suggestive evidence on the extent of bunching due to turnover
misreporting. When bunching is due to a decrease in real output, we expect companies to
reduce their input costs in proportion, so that the distribution of input-cost ratio for non-
registered companies should be smooth around the VAT notch. When bunching is due to
turnover misreporting, we conjecture that the non-registered companies are less likely to
under-report their input costs and wage expenses. Both costs are deductible for corporation
taxes and the latter is subject to third-party reporting. In other words, the gain from under-
reporting the deductible costs is considerably smaller than the gain from under reporting
the turnover to avoid VAT registration. If the majority of companies bunch via turnover
misreporting, we would expect to see a higher average input-cost ratio for the non-registered
group just below the VAT notch, relative to that for the registered group.
Figure A.9 pools all observations in the sample period and plots the distribution of
average input-cost ratio for registered and non-registered companies in £1,000 turnover bins,
respectively. In Panel A, the input-cost ratio is salary exclusive and represents the share of
direct cost of sales relative to total turnover. The solid blue line shows the average input
cost relative to sales for registered companies within each turnover bin of £1,000 normalized
by the current-year VAT notch, and the dashed blue line shows the average input cost ratio
for the unregistered companies. Consistent with the theory, voluntary registers incur a much
larger input cost as indicated by their average input-cost ratio which is consistently larger
than that for the non-registered companies below the VAT notch. On the other hand, there
is no evident increase in the average input-cost ratio just below the VAT notch for the
non-registered group. The distribution is relatively smooth and continues to increase with
turnover above the VAT notch.
In comparison, Panel B plots the distribution of average input-cost ratio inclusive of
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salary, for registered and non-registered companies, respectively. There is striking difference
between the two input-cost ratio series just below the VAT notch. The two series move in
parallel directions until the average input-cost ratio for the non-registered companies starts
to increase drastically just below the VAT notch. The sharp increase in the salary-inclusive
cost ratio can be partly attributed to the fixed nature of salary cost which takes longer to
adjust than variable costs of input. On the other hand, the sharp increase is also consistent
with the fact that salary is subject to third-party reporting and thus it is more costly/difficult
for small businesses to underreport salary expenses. Overall, Panel A and B in Figure A.9
provide suggestive yet not conclusive evidence that part of bunching is due to turnover
misreporting.
E Dynamic Regressions of Voluntary Registration
In this section, we investigate the importance of inertia in driving VAT registration by ana-
lyzing the dynamic behavior of firms when they cross the registration and deregistration
thresholds. First, we compute a transition probability matrix for firms changing their regis-
tration states in Table A.1, which shows the probability of being registered or not registered
t years after initially being in a given state.50 For example, the entry in the first cell of the
matrix, indicates that of all the firms that where initially registered in year 2004/05, 82.2%
remained registered a year later.
Table A.1 shows that there is considerable persistence in registration status. On the
other hand, comparing to the registered firms, this persistence does decline substantially over
time for non-registered firms. For example, 81.4% of initially non-registered firms remain
unregistered after 5 years, whereas 64% of registered firms remain registered after 5 years.
The difference in persistence is due to the fact that the majority of firms are growing over
our sample, and so will tend to stay above the registration threshold once they cross it.
Next, we investigate to what extent the registration decision is driven by persistence
in turnover versus the costs of changing registration status. To answer this question, we
augment equation (23) as follows:
Rit = γ0 + γ1Ri,t−1 + γ2(1−Ri,t−1)IRit + γ3Rit−1IDit (E.42)
+γ4B2C
j
it + γ5ICRit + γ6L
j
it + γ7Dit + ρt + φi + νit
50Changes in the transition probability could also driven by attrition, therefore we focus on a balanced
sample of firms that we observe throughout the sample period.
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where Rit is a dummy indicator that takes value 1 if the firm is currently registered and zero
otherwise, as defined previously in Section 7.1. In addition,
IRit =
{
1, Yit ≥ Zt
0, Yit < Zt
, IDit =
{
1, Yit ≥ Z ′t
0, Yit < Z
′
t
,
where Zt, Z
′
t are the registration and deregistration thresholds at time t, Yit denotes the
current-period turnover, so IRit and IDit are dummy indicators recording whether the firm
is above the registration and deregistration thresholds respectively at time t. All the other
variables are defined as before, and υit is the error term. We estimate equation (E.42) in a
fixed-effect Probit model, and augment the estimation equation with the initial registration
status Ri0 and the mean characteristics of all the time-varying regressors (Wooldridge, 2005).
So, if firm registration decision was entirely backward-looking and ignores its current
turnover relative to Zt, Z
′
t, we would expect the coefficients γ2 to γ5 to be insignificant.
However, we expect most firms to comply with the VAT law. Specifically, we expect firms to
register when they are initially not registered and their turnover passes above the threshold.
Such a firm has a value 1 for the term (1 − Rit−1)IRit and so we expect to find a positive
γ2.
The VAT legislation also requires firms to stay registered if they are registered in the
previous year and their current turnover is above the deregistration threshold. Such a firm
will have a value of 1 for Rit−1IDit. So, we also expect to find that γ3 > 0. On the other hand,
if the firm remains registered simply due to the cost of deregistration such that whether
crossing the deregistration threshold plays no role in the registration behavior, we would
expect to find that γ3 = 0.
Finally, we already know from our analysis of voluntary registration that the registration
decision is significantly affected by the industry B2C ratio B2Cjit, the firm input cost ratio
ICRit, and the industry-level Lerner index L
j
it, so we expect γ4, γ5 and γ6 to be positive.
Table A.2 reports the full results from estimating equation (E.42) using a fixed-effects
Probit model, following Wooldridge (2005). For ease of interpretation, Table A.3 reports
the relevant average partial effects, which refer to the effect on the mean probability of re-
gistration after averaging the unobserved heterogeneity across all firms in the sample. For
example, to calculate the APE of a discrete change of ID from 0 to 1, we first compute
the average predicted probability of registration at fixed values of Rt−1 = 1, IDt = 0 and
Rt−1 = 1, IDt = 1, respectively, across all firms in the sample. We then take the difference
between the two average probabilities to obtain the average partial effect of ID. We use a
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similar procedure to compute the average partial effect of a one-standard-deviation increase
in B2Cjit, ICRit, and L
j
it, noting that the one-standard-deviation increase applies to their
mean characteristics in addition to the time-varying values. Column (1) shows the mean
predicted probability of VAT registration at fixed value of Rt−1, IDt, IRt, the mean pre-
dicted probability across all firms in the sample and that for one-standard-deviation increase
in B2Cjit, ICRit, and L
j
it. Column (2) shows the average partial effects of these variables by
taking the difference in the mean predicted probabilities given the change in their value. For
example, for firms that are registered in the previous year, falling below the deregistration
threshold lowers the probability of being currently registered by 5 percentage points. Altern-
atively, for firms that are not registered in the previous year, going above the registration
threshold increases their probability of registration by 70.4 percentage points. These findings
suggest that the registration decision is not entirely driven by the cost of deregistration or
inertia.
Finally, the short-run partial effects of the share of B2C sales and the input cost ratio in
the dynamic model are considerably smaller than the static estimates in section 7.1. A one
standard deviation increase in the B2C ratio and the Lerner index reduces the probability
of registration by 0.1 and 0.25 percentage points, respectively, and there is no significant
change in the probability of registration for one standard deviation increase in the input cost
ratio.
Overall, we see that while there is a considerable amount of persistence in firm behavior,
the registration decision is not entirely driven by inertia due to fixed cost of deregistra-
tion. Firms respect the legal registration requirement, and at the same time change their
registration decisions in a way that is consistent with profit maximization behavior depicted
in Section 4. The probability of registration is also affected significantly by the more fun-
damental determinants of VAT registration. The positive coefficient estimates and partial
effects of Rit−1IDit, the B2C ratio and the input-cost ratio provides supportive evidence
that the VAT registration decision is rational and relates to the fundamental determinants
of VAT registration as predicted by the theory in Section 5.
F Data construction
Our data combined two administrative datasets – Corporation Tax returns (CT600) and
VAT returns, with two additional data sources - Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME),
and annual sector-level statistics on the share of sales to final consumers (B2C ratio) based
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on the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Input-Output tables. This section describes how
we construct our sample.
We first link CT600 corporate tax return and FAME company account using company
identifier (93% of records in CT600 were merged with FAME with 12 months accounting
period), resulting in 7,914,902 company-year records covering April 1, 2004-April 4, 2015.
This includes company that has (i) non-missing turnover, (ii) single CT600 account in one
accounting year with full 12-months period, (iii) non-negative fixed assets (measured in
FAME), (iv) do not engaged mainly in overseas activities based on HMRC trade classification,
or (v) is not part of company group. Our sample exclude non-profit organizations/companies
– that includes charitable organization, industrial and provident society and company limited
by guarantee; we also exclude LLP, public investment trust; we exclude companies in financial
services industry under SIC.
We then merge the CT600-FAME data with the VAT returns, excluding company in their
VAT record that has (i) registered as a group, (ii) the same registration and deregistration
date, (iii) non-corporation status, or (iv) measurement error – when input VAT is greater
than the input value, or output VAT tax rate is greater than the statutory rate.
We further link the CT600-FAME-VAT data with annual B2C ratio from ONS at 2-digit
SIC industry level, for industries which the B2C ratios are available from the Input-Output
tables - that consists of 6,536,170 company-year observations. Our sample for analysis in-
cludes observations with yearly turnover between £10,000 to £200,000, consists of 3,461,247
company-year observations with 968,353 unique companies between 2004/2005 to 2014/2015.
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Appendix Figures
Figure A.1. Registration status of firms below threshold by year
Notes: The figure plots the probability of firms voluntarily registered during 2004/05-
2009/10, for firms that are below VAT threshold.
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Figure A.2. Annual Turnover Distribution around the Registration threshold, 2004/05-
2014/15
(a) 2004 (b) 2005 (c) 2006
(d) 2007 (e) 2008 (f) 2009
(g) 2010 (h) 2011 (i) 2012
(j) 2013 (k) 2014
Notes: This figure shows the histogram of companies within the neighborhood of turnover for each
year between 2004/05-2014/15. The bin width is £1,000 and the red line denotes the VAT notch.
The dash line denotes the VAT notch in the previous year.
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Figure A.3. Bunching across Quartiles of the B2C Share Distribution
(a) Binding VAT Threshold (b) Nonbinding VAT Threshold
Notes: this figure shows the raw distribution of companies’ turnover around the normalized
VAT notch across four different quartiles of the distribution of the share of B2C sales for
the pooled dataset for period 2004/05-2014/15. Panel (a) shows the distributions for the
subset of firms not predicted to register voluntarily. Panel (b) shows the distributions for
the subset of firms predicted to register voluntarily, for whom the threshold is nonbinding.
The corresponding bunching estimates are reported in Figure 4 in the main text.
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Figure A.4. Bunching across Quartiles of the Lerner Index Distribution
(a) Binding VAT Threshold (b) Nonbinding VAT Threshold
Notes: this figure shows the raw distribution of companies’ turnover around the normalized
VAT notch across four different quartiles of the distribution of the Lerner Index for the pooled
dataset for period 2004/05-2014/15. Panel (a) shows the distributions for the subset of firms
not predicted to register voluntarily. Panel (b) shows the distributions for the subset of firms
predicted to register voluntarily, for whom the threshold is nonbinding. The corresponding
bunching estimates are reported in Figure 5 in the main text.
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Figure A.5. Bunching across Quartiles of the Input-Cost Ratio Distribution
(a) Binding VAT Threshold (b) Nonbinding VAT Threshold
Notes: this figure shows the raw distribution of companies’ turnover around the normalized
VAT notch across four different quartiles of the distribution of the input-cost ratio for the
pooled dataset for period 2004/05-2014/15. Panel (a) shows the distributions for the subset
of firms not predicted to register voluntarily. Panel (b) shows the distributions for the
subset of firms predicted to register voluntarily, for whom the threshold is nonbinding. The
corresponding bunching estimates are reported in Figure 6 in the main text.
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Figure A.6. Bunching by Quartiles of B2C, by Lower Bound of Excluded Region
(a) Lower bound = − £6,000
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(b) Lower bound = − £12,000
0
1
2
3
Bu
nc
hin
g 
Es
tim
at
e
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
B2C Share Quartile
0
1
2
3
Bu
nc
hin
g 
Es
tim
at
e
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
B2C Share Quartile
(c) Lower bound = − £18,000
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Notes: This figure presents the bunching estimates by quartiles of the distribution of share
of B2C sales. The left figure in each panel is constructed for firms predicted not to register
voluntarily (i.e., for which the VAT threshold is binding), while the right figure is constructed
using only firms predicted to register voluntarily, for which the VAT threshold is non-binding.
In panels A (top), B (middle) and C (bottom), we report bunching estimates under the
assumption that the excluded range begins £6,000, £12,000 and £18,000 below the VAT
threshold, respectively.
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Figure A.7. Bunching by Quartiles of Input-Cost Ratio, by Lower Bound of Excluded Region
(a) Lower bound = − £6,000
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(b) Lower bound = − £12,000
0
1
2
3
4
Bu
nc
hin
g 
Es
tim
at
e
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Input-Cost Ratio Quartile
0
1
2
3
4
Bu
nc
hin
g 
Es
tim
at
e
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Input-Cost Ratio Quartile
(c) Lower bound = − £18,000
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Notes: This figure presents the bunching estimates by quartiles of the distribution of input-
cost ratio. The left figure in each panel is constructed for firms predicted not to register
voluntarily (i.e., for which the VAT threshold is binding), while the right figure is constructed
using only firms predicted to register voluntarily, for which the VAT threshold is non-binding.
In panels A (top), B (middle) and C (bottom), we report bunching estimates under the
assumption that the excluded range begins £6,000, £12,000 and £18,000 below the VAT
threshold, respectively.
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Figure A.8. Bunching by Quartiles of Lerner Index, by Lower Bound of Excluded Region
(a) Lower bound = − £6,000
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(b) Lower bound = − £12,000
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(c) Lower bound = − £18,000
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Notes: This figure presents the bunching estimates by quartiles of the distribution of share
of B2C sales. The left figure in each panel is constructed for firms predicted not to register
voluntarily (i.e., for which the VAT threshold is binding), while the right figure is constructed
using only firms predicted to register voluntarily, for which the VAT threshold is non-binding.
In panels A (top), B (middle) and C (bottom), we report bunching estimates under the
assumption that the excluded range begins £6,000, £12,000 and £18,000 below the VAT
threshold, respectively.
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Figure A.9. Bunching via Turnover Misreporting
(a) Distribution of Direct Input-Cost Ratio
(b) Distribution of Salary-Inclusive Cost Ratio
Notes: the figure plots separately the average input cost ratio for registered and non-
registered firms with a turnover in the neighborhood of normalized VAT notch during
2004/05-2009/10. Panel A uses the input cost ratio calculated from FAME and exclude
the salary expenses. Panel B uses the input cost ratio calculated from the corporation tax
records and includes salary expenses in the overall cost.
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Appendix Tables
Table A.1. Transition Matrix of VAT Registration Status
Rt = 1 Rt = 1 Rt = 0 Rt = 0
IDt = 1 IDt = 0 IRt = 1 IRt = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t = 1
R0 = 1, ID0 = 1 82.23% 16.79% 0.30% 0.68%
R0 = 1, ID0 = 0 19.03% 78.06% 0.16% 2.75%
R0 = 0, ID0 = 1 9.69% 2.97% 61.57% 25.77%
R0 = 0, ID0 = 0 2.23% 3.28% 5.60% 88.90%
t = 2
R0 = 1, ID0 = 1 76.93% 21.13% 0.38% 1.55%
R0 = 1, ID0 = 0 22.66% 72.31% 0.29% 4.74%
R0 = 0, ID0 = 1 11.18% 4.97% 53.29% 30.56%
R0 = 0, ID0 = 0 4.14% 4.99% 5.87% 85.00%
t = 3
R0 = 1, ID0 = 1 72.67% 24.46% 0.45% 2.42%
R0 = 1, ID0 = 0 23.53% 69.96% 0.33% 6.19%
R0 = 0, ID0 = 1 12.29% 5.99% 48.45% 33.26%
R0 = 0, ID0 = 0 5.24% 6.25% 5.56% 82.94%
t = 4
R0 = 1, ID0 = 1 68.63% 27.06% 0.63% 3.69%
R0 = 1, ID0 = 0 23.19% 68.47% 0.40% 7.94%
R0 = 0, ID0 = 1 12.35% 6.87% 45.13% 35.65%
R0 = 0, ID0 = 0 6.00% 7.19% 4.88% 81.93%
t = 5
R0 = 1, ID0 = 1 64.35% 30.68% 0.52% 4.45%
R0 = 1, ID0 = 0 21.88% 69.23% 0.33% 8.56%
R0 = 0, ID0 = 1 12.57% 8.01% 41.40% 38.02%
R0 = 0, ID0 = 0 6.07% 7.96% 4.53% 81.44%
Notes: this table shows in each cell the probability of changing
from registration status in year t to year t+ 1.
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Table A.2. Determinants of VAT Voluntary Registration: Probit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lagged Registration (Rt-1) 3.700*** 3.420*** 3.973*** 3.693*** 3.689*** 3.681*** 3.716*** 3.679*** 3.702***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Initial Reg Status (R0) 0.937*** 0.869*** 0.375*** 0.511*** 0.756*** 0.758*** 0.669*** 0.756*** 0.665***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
R*ID 1.838*** 1.677*** 0.961*** 0.971*** 0.958*** 0.967*** 0.957***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
(1-R)*IR 4.937*** 5.200*** 4.730*** 4.729*** 4.790*** 4.715*** 4.764***
(0.062) (0.066) (0.072) (0.072) (0.084) (0.072) (0.084)
Distance to Threshold -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average Distance to Threshold 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share of B2C Sales 0.094 0.150
(0.129) (0.136)
Average Share of B2C Sales -0.598*** -0.410***
(0.130) (0.136)
Input-Cost Ratio 0.229*** 0.203***
(0.020) (0.020)
Average Input-Cost Ratio -0.396*** -0.136***
(0.024) (0.025)
Lerner Index 0.719*** 0.464**
(0.182) (0.191)
Average Lerner Index -2.121*** -1.573***
(0.187) (0.197)
Constant -2.163*** -2.168*** -2.146*** -2.240*** -1.807*** -1.528*** -1.758*** -0.746*** -0.861***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.023)
lnsig2u
Constant -0.743*** -0.686*** -2.163*** -1.419*** -0.920*** -0.927*** -1.058*** -0.950*** -1.079***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.077) (0.044) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036)
Observations 2016377 2016377 2016377 2016377 2016377 2016377 1773902 2016377 1773902
Chi-sq stat B2C 1734.538 373.728
Chi-sq p-val B2C 0 0
Chi-sq stat CostRatio 126.958 18.274
Chi-sq p-val CostRatio 0 0
Chi-sq stat Lerner 2623.417 1201.127
Chi-sq p-val Lerner 0 0
Sigma(u) 0.690 0.710 0.339 0.492 0.631 0.629 0.589 0.622 0.583
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-FE No No No No No No No No No
Cost-Ratio Source CT600 (new) CT600 (new)
Notes: this table presents the coefficient estimates from the dynamic estimation of VAT
registration in equation (E.42) in a fixed-effect Probit model.
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Table A.3. Determinants of VAT Voluntary Registration: Average Partial Effects
Evaluated at: Mean ̂Pr(Rt = 1) Average Partial Effect
(1) (2)
Rt−1 = 1 IDt = 1 0.987
Rt−1 = 1 IDt = 0 0.931 0.0557***
(0.0010)
Rt−1 = 0 IRt = 1 0.989
Rt−1 = 0 IRt = 0 0.206 0.782***
(0.0034)
Average in the sample: 0.602
B2C + σB2C 0.600 -0.0028***
(0.00015)
ICR + σICR 0.603 0.0073***
(0.00017)
Lerner + σLerner 0.597 -0.0058***
(0.00017)
Notes: this table presents the partial effects of the key variables of interest from the dynamic
estimation of VAT registration in equation (E.42). The partial effects are based on the
coefficient estimates reported in column 9 of Table A.2.
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